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USING INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE RESOLUTION
TO ADDRESS THE COMPLIANCE QUESTION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW
ANNA SPAIN*

I.

INTRODUCTION

In July 2007, the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North
Korea) announced its decision to shut down four facilities at its
Yongbyon nuclear site and allow International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) monitoring there.1 Subsequently, on October 12, 2008, the
U.S. Department of State removed North Korea from its decade-long
placement on the State Sponsors of Terrorism list. 2 These events
stemmed from ongoing multilateral efforts to peacefully denuclearize
the Korean Peninsula through an international process known as the
Six-Party Talks. Through this process, North Korea has taken steps to
recommence conformity with its international legal obligations. UN
Security Council resolutions, IAEA findings of noncompliance, politi* Incoming Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado at Boulder Law School.

Deputy Director, UCLA Burkle Center for International Relations (2007-2009). The author was
formerly an Attorney-Adviser at the U.S. Department of State. The views expressed herein are
solely those of the author and do not represent the views of the U.S. Government. Appreciation
and thanks to Angela Banks, Jacob Bercovitch, Bob Bordone, David Kaye, Russell Korobkin, Doug
Kysar, Michael Moffitt, Kal Raustiala, Richard Reuben, Cesare Romano, Richard Steinberg, and
Kantathi Suphamongkhon for their helpful comments on earlier drafts and to Erik Preston and
the UCLA Law Library for valuable research assistance. © 2009, Anna Spain.
1. David E. Sanger, North Korea Says They've Shut NuclearReactor, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2007, at
Al; Press Release, Sean McCormack, U.S. Dep't of State, North Korea-Shutdown of Yongbyon
Facilities (July 14, 2007), availableat http://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2007/88414.htm.
2. The U.S. Department of State considers nations listed on its State Sponsors of Terrorism
list as States of Concern. See U.S. Department of State, State Sponsors of Terrorism, http://
www.state.gov/s/ct/cl4151.htm. In March 2008, there were five countries on the State Sponsors
of Terrorism list, including North Korea. North Korea was removed in October 2008. See Helene
Cooper, U.S. Declares North Korea Off Terror List, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 12, 2008, at Al. See alsoJeremy
Walden-Schertz, North Korea'sLeaders Master the Mixed Signal,THE NATIONAL, Jan. 6, 2009, available
at http://www.thenational.ae/article/20090106/FOREIGN/407286230/1015.
3. SeeJOSEPH CIRINCIONE &JON WoLFSTHAL, CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INT'L PEACE, BREACH OF
CONTRACT IN KOREA 1 (1998), http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=
view&id=110&prog=zgp&proj=znpp (noting that although North Korea became a member
state to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1985, its continued nuclear program
activities led to an IAEA finding of nonconformity with safeguard obligations in 1993 prompting
the formation of the Agreed Framework Agreement in 1994 between North Korea and the U.S.);
see also David Albright and Paul Brennan, Disabling DPRK Nuclear Facilities (Oct. 23, 2007)
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cal pressure and economic isolation have failed to achieve the outcomes, albeit preliminary, reached through the Six-Party Talks. As then
Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, acknowledged, "[W]e are learning more about Pyongyang's nuclear effoixts through the six-party
framework than we otherwise would be. And ... this policy is our best

option to achieve the strategic goal of 4 verifiably eliminating North
Korea's nuclear weapons and programs.
The basic premise that international law (IL) is the preferred process
for resolving conflict between nations is evident. 5 Peace among nations
has been a long-standing goal. In 1899, nations gathered at the First
Hague Peace Conference to establish a series of declarations supporting the peaceful settlement of disputes between nations.6 After World
War II, nations gathered again to adopt Chapter VI of the UN Charter
requiring that states seek peaceful methods to resolve disputes that
could lead to war or if efforts fail, refer the matter to the UN Security
Council. 7 When international law fails to secure peace or achieve
desired outcomes, states resort to the use of force or other coercive
measures. As the Six-Party Talks demonstrate, states also seek options
for the peaceful resolution of disputes that range from the use of
conciliation to mediation to truth and reconciliation processes. Yet
understanding how and' why process affects behavior remains limited.
Existing compliance theories consider how interests, norms and legal
process impact states. Within the international legal process school,
theories either narrowly define process as methods that achieve a legal
aim (i.e., dispute settlement, tribunals) or broadly consider diplomatic
activities without sufficiently connecting them to the structural elements of process. This leaves many questions about process unanswered. What exact influence did the Six-Party Talks exert on North
Korea and what is the best system of analysis for understanding such
questions? Drawing from the existing compliance literature as well as
related discipline of conflict resolution, this Article addresses these
questions by offering an analytical framework for understanding how

(working paper, on file with the U.S. Institute for Peace, Institute for Science and International
Security), availableat http://www.usip.org/pubs/working-papers/wp5-dprk.pdf.
4. Condoleezza Rice, Op-Ed., Diplomacy Is Working on North Korea, WALL ST. J., June 26, 2008,
atAl5.
5. JOHN COLLIER & VAUGHAN LowE, THE SETTLEMENTS OF DISPUTES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 2-3

(1999).
6. Jacob Bercovitch, Introduction: Putting Mediation in Context, in STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL
MEDIATION: ESSAYS IN HONOR OF JEFFREY Z. RUrBIN 1, 3 (Jacob Bercovitch ed., 2002) [hereinafter
STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION].

7. U.N. Charter art. 33, para. 1.
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international legal process impacts the behavioral factors (interests,
rights, identity, power, etc.) and tools (coercion, persuasion, acculturation, coordination, etc.) that affect state behavior. This Article makes
the following central claims.
First, international legal process theory has the potential to offer a
superior descriptive framework for analyzing state behavior because it
can comprehensively address a variety of criteria. Mainstream compliance theories do not adequately account for all aspects of state behavior. 8 For example, interests, albeit important, are not the only factors
that shape what states do. 9 Rational choice theory may explain why
North Korea's internal interests motivate it to bargain for heavy fuel oil
in exchange for giving up components of its nuclear program, but the
theory fails to illuminate why such an exchange has been possible
through the Six-Party Talks when earlier attempts failed.'0 As the
Six-Party Talks example demonstrates, there is a real need to address
how and why process can influence states. While scholarship has
advanced understanding about state interests, norms, and institutions,
the importance of process is often overlooked.'1
Second, expanding international legal process theory to include
tools defined here as international dispute resolution is necessary in
order to account for the full range of mechanisms currently in use.

8. See Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter, InternationalLaw, InternationalRelations and

Compliance, in HANDBOOK

OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 538, 541-44 (Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds.,
2002) (offering a chronological review of the literature starting with Cold War theorists McDougal, Chayes, Henkin, Shachter, and Falk, then moving to 1980s regime theorists Keohane,
Kractohwil, Checkel, and Risse et al., to 1990s focus on legitimacy theory by Franck, Hart, and
Keohane, and finally to a more recent focus on state compliance with decisions of international
courts and tribunals).
9. See FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw AND PoLITcS 1-6 (Oona A. Hathaway & Harold
Hongju Koh eds., 2005) [hereinafter FOUNDATIONS]. Hathaway & Koh provide an overview of
leading IL and international relations (IR) theories organized conceptually as interest-based and
norm-based. They also provide an overview of literature organized by discipline, including IL
theories like Chayes & Chayes' general theory of compliance promoting international collaboration and collective management and Koh's obedience theory discussing a transnational, as
opposed to an international approach, as well as IR theories like those of Keohane, Kractochwil,
Checkel, and Risse on regime theory and rational choice and Downs, Rocke, and Barssom on
enforcement theory of compliance, proposing a direct causal relationship between increased state
compliance with regime commitments and more stringent enforcement mechanisms for those
commitments.
10. SeejACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 15-17 (2005).
See also Margaret E. McGuinness, Exploring the Limits of InternationalHuman Rights Law 34 GA.
J. INT'L & COMp. L. 393 (2006).

11. See ROSALYN

HIGGINS, PROBLEMS & PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAw AND How WE USE IT

(Oxford Univ. Press 2006) (1994).
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Categories of international legal process are commonly separated into
legal methods that are binding (adjudication through courts or tribunals, arbitration) and diplomatic methods that are non-binding (good
offices, negotiation, and conciliation) .12 This distinction fails to acknowledge another disciplinary perspective, commonly referred to in the
U.S. as alternative dispute resolution, which includes all alternatives to
litigation (mediation, arbitration, negotiation, conciliation, etc.). Thus,
for the purposes of this Article, I introduce a new organizing principleinternational dispute resolution (IDR). This umbrella term refers to
the methods of arbitration, conciliation, facilitation, negotiation, and
mediation used in an international context to prevent, manage, or
resolve international disputes. While each process is distinct, they share
a common set of unifying principles and assumptions. IDR is voluntary,
strives to achieve peaceful resolution of disputes, aims to reframe
conceptions of rational decision-making, and understands that individuals are the driving force behind even state behavior. However, despite
the increasing use of IDR to deal with global problems, existing
compliance theories do not comprehensively address how IDR affects
state behavior. 14 Although methods of dispute settlement are discussed, they are treated merely as tools for achieving judicial settlement 15 and thus fail to account for the full effect IDR has on state
behavior. They neglect the larger historical, normative, and functional
aspects that make IDR a distinctive area of study. Because international
legal process theory needs to be inclusive of these kinds of process. This
Article introduces IDR into the analysis. Given the wide range of

12. Each process is distinct as to whether or not it is binding and the level of control that the
parties have over the process. PETER MALANCzUK, AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 275 (7th ed. 1997).

13. For purposes of this article International Dispute Resolution or IDR includes a) arbitration, conciliation, facilitation, negotiation, mediation b) when applied in an inter-state, transnational or international context c) for the purposes of assessing, preventing, managing, or resolving

relations and/or disputes or conflicts. The processes referred to under the IDR term are also
commonly used in domestic and foreign settings and are commonly known as alternative dispute
resolution or ADR. There is no generally accepted framework for differentiating between an ADR
process or and IDR process, although the application of a process in the international arena often
involves specialized theories and practices that include and go beyond domestic ADR. For
purposes of clarification in this Article, I distinguish such international uses ofADR by referring to
them as International Dispute Resolution.
14. See generally Oona Hathaway & Ariel Lavinbuk, Rationalism and Revisionism in International
Law, 119 HARV. L. REv. 1404 (2006) (book review).
15. SeeAbram Chayes & Antonia Handler Chayes, The New Sovereignty, in FOUNDATIONS, supra

note 10, at 174, 179-80 (discussing the use of dispute settlement within the larger rubric of
international legal process).
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available forms, only four IDR methods-arbitration, negotiation, mediation, and conciliation-are addressed here.16
Third, the analysis suggests that IDR influences states in ways that are
distinctive and important. IDR's assumptions (i.e., that human beings
are the driving force behind even state behavior and actors do not
always make rational decisions) allow for more precise analysis of state
behavior. IDR affects states by creating a permeable culture in which
actors are more likely to absorb the norms of IDR (e.g., collaboration,
coordination, problem-solving, etc.).17 Following the work of Hart &
Sacks and Franck, IDR encourages criteria like voluntary participation
and legitimacy, which can foster greater compliance with international
law.18 For example, Tyler has demonstrated that when actors find that
the process used to create a law is legitimate, they are more likely to
comply with it. 19 IDR supports the creation of legitimate processes
because of its design elements like structural flexibility and lack of a
strict hierarchy, emphasizing factors that can induce agreement formation and ultimately voluntary compliance.2 °
The example of the Six-Party Talks demonstrates these insights.
North Korea's decision to disarm several nuclear sites came out of the
Six-Party Talks and was undoubtedly the result of a complex interplay
of factors (e.g. interests, identity, etc.) and process. As this Article will
demonstrate, expanded international legal theory analysis provides the
following explanation for North Korea's decision. North Korea's ability
to design and influence the process appears paramount in its decision
to participate.2 1 Through participation, it was able to help design the

16. Arbitration is often placed under the rubric of international adjudication instead of
diplomacy. IDR offers a third organizing principle that includes all forms of collaborative dispute
resolution methods. Although arbitration shares many similarities with court-based adjudication,
it differs in its more collaborative procedural elements and has been used as a diplomatic platform
to repair inter-state relations, e.g. Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal. In the domestic context, arbitration
is considered to be a form of ADR as opposed to litigation. For these reasons, arbitration is
included under the umbrella of IDR.

17. See CHESTER A. CROCKER ET AL., TURBULENT PEACE: THE CHALLENGES OF MANAGING INTERNATIONAL CoN-icT 447-48 (2001) (discussing mutual gains theory, value creation and other
problem solving theories) [hereinafter CROCKER ET AL., TURBULENT PEACE].
18. See generally HENRY M. HARTJR. & ALBERT M. SACES, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN
THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW (1994); THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE POWER OF LEGITIMACYAMONG
NATIONS (1990).
19. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAw 62 (2006) (1990).
20. Dean G. Pruitt, Mediator Behavior and Success in Mediation, in STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL
MEDIATION, supra note 7, at 41, 43.
21. See statements made by Dr. Kantathi Suphamongkon recalling from his discussions with
North Korea that North Korea was encouraged to participate in the Six-Party talks in part due to its
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process to allow for bilateral communication with the U.S. within the
multilateral framework. The flexibility of a framework that allows all
key participants to help shape process was critical. North Korea's ability
to help design the process also served another important function-it
served North Korea's identity-based needs: to be seen as an equal
sovereign state and to receive clear recognition by the U.S. 22 By having
needs like these met, North Korea (and other participants) engaged in
the process in a way that fostered communication and coordination
about interests, notjust positions. The Six-Party Talks demonstrate how
allowing participants to help design process is one way to encourage
participation, which is often a prerequisite for voluntary compliance
and problem-solving behavior.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part II reviews existing compliance
theories and presents an expanded international legal process approach that introduces critical IDR perspectives. Part III provides
necessary historical background and overview of IDR. Part IV establishes the core claims of this Article and presents the analytical framework for assessing state behavior that considers how international legal
process, particularly IDR, shapes the factors (interests, identity, rights,
power, etc.), and tools (coercion, persuasion, acculturation, etc.) that
influence state behavior. Part V addresses three core challenges: selection bias, the shortcomings of interdisciplinary analysis, and relevant
limits of IDR. The Article concludes by offering normative perspectives
about how international legal process and IDR should inform future
conceptions of state behavior.
II.

THE VALUE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS THEORY IN STATE

BEHAVIOR ANALYSIS
Before discussing IDR, it is necessary to place international legal
process theory into existing compliance literature and examine why it
offers a comprehensive analytical framework for understanding state

ability to have direct and private talks with the United States within the context of the Six-Party
talks. Podcast: Kantathi Suphamongkon, Foreign Minister of Thailand, Conference on U.S.
Foreign Policy Toward Rogue States (Mar. 11, 2008), available at http://www.international.
ucla.edu/burkle/podcasts/article.asp?parentid=105882 (Dr. Suphamonkhon's statements are
15 minutes into the recording).
22. Id.; see also Interview with Kantathi Suphamongkhon, Foreign Minister of Thailand, in
LA, Cal. (Jan. 23,2009). During his tenure as Foreign Minister of Thailand, Dr. Suphamongkhon
traveled to Pyongyang on an official diplomatic visit and met with North Korean government
officials. His knowledge regarding North Korea's perspectives on the Six-Party Talks is based on
discussions he had during this visit.
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behavior. State compliance with international legal rules and obligations is often the measuring device used to gauge whether international law influences states. Scholarship on state behavior and compliance is prolific and originates from many disciplines including
international law and international relations. 23 Theories vary by organizing principle and are categorized historically2 4 by disciplinary perspective and by analytical aim.2 6 For example, scholars have proposed
arguments of compliance, such as Henkin's theory that most states
comply most of the time; 2 7 arguments about why and when states
comply, delving into analysis of factors and tools that motivate and
affect state behavior; 2s and entirely new theories categorized as interestbased vs. norm-based 29 that redefine compliance and its relationship to
international law by examining external factors such as legitimacy and
obedience. 0 Compliance literature traditionally treats the principles
and norms that form IL and the outcomes themselves, such as rules or

23. As there are many differences between IL and IR approaches to compliance, I mention
two that are particularly relevant here. Much of IL scholarship assumes Henkin's theory on state
compliance as fact where IR scholars test the assumption through empirical studies. Second, IL
makes distinctions between legal and non-legal rules whereas IR does not. See Raustiala &
Slaughter, supra note 9, at 539.
24. See id. at 539-44.
25. See FOUNDATIONS, supra note 10, at 1-6.

26. For a review of leading IL and IR theories organized conceptually as interest-based and
norm-based, see id. at 2-3.
27. See generaUy Louis HENMN, How NATIONS BEHAVE (2d ed. 1979) (presenting a theory that
most states comply with international law most of the time).
28. See FOUNDATIONS, supra note 10, at 112-32 (discussing the arguments of constructivists
such as Keohane, Katochwil, Checkel, and Risse et al. that state behavior is motivated by
internalized identities and norms of appropriate behavior).
29. Id. at 2-3.
30. See Thomas M. Franck, Fairnessin InternationalLaw and Institutions,in FOUNDATIONS, supra
note 10, at 46 (providing an overview of Franck's theory of legitimacy, in which Franck argues that
perceptions about the legitimacy of rules directly impact a community's motivation to comply with
those rules, when that community and its cultural identity is organized around rules); H.L.A. Hart,
InternationalLaw, in FOUNDATIONS, supra note 10, at 136 (discussing how legitimacy plus the four
characteristics of the "right process" lead to compliance; Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations
Obey?, in FOUNDATIONS, supra note 10, at 195 (discussing a theory of obedience based on state
internalization of norms occurring as a part of the transnational legal process); FOUNDATIONS,
supra note 10, at 171 (discussing Robert Keohane's critique of Franck's theory from an IR
rationalist-instrumentalist perspective, whereby Keohane claims that Franck's argument is circular
because if Franck is correct about a chain of causation between the right process and state
compliance, state behavior essentially recycles back to affect the right process).

20091
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agreements.3 1
Given the diversity of such theories, explaining North Korea's behavior would seem straightforward. Realists consider state behavior to be
primarily motivated by internal interests. The underlying assumption is
that while external factors may constrain state behavior, they do not
motivate it. 32 Specifically, Goldsmith and Posner's expansion of rationalchoice theory relies on assumptions about domestic politics and democratic governance that become less relevant for a state ruled by a
dictator, like North Korea. 33 An institutionalism perspective may consider how the regime theory aspects of the Six-Party process influenced
state behavior. 34 As Keohane posits, states strategically use regimes to
achieve their interests.3 5 Although this approach considers a broader
array of behavioral influences, it falls short of analyzing the full
complexity of factors behind North Korea's behavior. Liberal theories
offer insights that are helpful elsewhere, they are not particularly
instructive for explaining the behavior of an authoritarian state that
36
lacks considerations of domestic politics.
Norm-based theories of state compliance generally share an assumption that states are motivated by moral obligation and legitimacy of the
law.37 Legal process scholars argue that the legitimacy of law should be
measured by the process through which it was created. Hart links
legitimacy to process by suggesting that four characteristics of the
"right process" lead to compliance. Further considerations about
process have been offered by Franck's theory as to how perceptions
about the legitimacy of rules can directly impact a community's motivation to comply with those rules. Tyler expands this to show why

31. Raustiala & Slaughter, supra note 9, at 539 (arguing that "most theories of compliance
with international law are at bottom theories of the behavioral influence of legal rules").
32. See generally Duncan Snidal, Rational Choice and InternationalRelations, in HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 9 (overview of rational choice theory).
33. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 11 at 7-10. But see Margaret E. McGuinness, supra note

11, at 395-98 (noting that Goldsmith and Posner's theory does not extend to international human
rights system because it fails to consider the broad range of interactions and influences between
human rights legal institutions and domestic actors and that law can result from state preferences
such as protection of human rights).
34. See FOUNDATIONS, supra note 10, at 50.
35. See id.
36. See generally Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Liberal Theory of InternationalLaw, in FOUNDATIONS,
supra note 10, at 94 (offering a description of liberalism and arguing that certain liberal
arguments are troubling because they fail to deal with the global reality which includes non-liberal
states like North Korea).
37. Raustiala & Slaughter, supranote 9, at 544.
38. Id. at 541 (citing H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994)).
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compliance is a function of legitimacy and hence a legitimate process.
Constructivists study how social constructs influence behavior-motivating factors (norms, interests, identity) .39 Although much of this work is
consistent with the claims made here, at present there is little expansion of this work into international legal process, and even less so to
IDR. Furthermore, most theories concentrate on one or a few factors,
but do not present a comprehensive approach that incorporates all the
factors and their interplay with process.
These theories of compliance are inadequate because they share an
assumption that interests or norms are the primary motivating factors
behind state behavior, and in doing so fail to account for the larger
interplay between other factors as well as tools of influence. The unitary
focus inhibits the observation of other critical factors, such as state
identity. A nation's leadership, the demographics of its citizens, and its
history and culture all play a role in determining politics, policy, and
therefore behavior. States' notions about other states shape conceptions of motivations and interests. The individual identities of diplomats who represent a state in an international legal process can also
influence the outcome. For North Korea, identity was arguably a key
factor of its decision-making process. North Korea is an authoritarian
state that maintains internal order through strict controls, some of
which violate norms of human rights. If North Korean diplomats are
interested in maintaining a perception of control, confidence, and
independence from the outside world, then yielding to predetermined
rules and process does not serve North Korea's interests in maintaining
its identity. Beyond interests and identity, there are a host of other
factors that influence behavior. In assuming a fixed primary motivating
factor, these theories of compliance fail to accommodate the fluid
nature of factors.
International legal process theory incorporates the role process plays
in affecting state behavior and compliance. The organizing philosophy
centers on the idea that behavior must be managed, not forced,
through process because addressing complex, global problems will
necessarily require the cooperation of states. The managerial approach
developed by Chayes emphasizes the horizontal interplay that occurs
between governments at the international level.4 ° While this approach
demonstrates how international cooperation and management can

39. See John Gerard Ruggie, What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianismand the
Social Constructivist Chalenge,in FOUNDATIONS, supra note 10, at 120.
40. See FOUNDATIONS, supra note 10, at 173.
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influence state compliance with treaty obligations, it does not adequately address the growing role of non-state actors. Furthermore,
because applications of this theory have focused on international legal
processes, they currently do not provide the necessary framework to
analyze broader forms including IDR.4 1 Koh's extension of this theory
considers the vertical, transnational approach and expands the analysis
beyond functionality into normativity. 4 2 Koh's work also breaks down
traditional IL assumptions that IDR does not share, like the importance
of state actors over non-state actors. 43 Compliance behavior is considered within the larger context of how outcomes are created, formalized, accepted, implemented and enforced, 44 thus recognizing political, social and economic considerations. 45 This approach helps reveal
how interests, decision-making and compliance behavior are formed
and, thus, how they can be influenced. In this same light, Higgins'
definition of law as a decision-making process captures the broader
view of process that this Article seeks to demonstrate.4 6
Following the prevailing wisdom of international legal process theory
that state behavior can be managed through process, this Article
proposes an analytic framework that comprehensively considers how
process affects the factors (interests, identity, rights, power, etc.) and
tools (coercion, persuasion, acculturation, etc.) that influence state
behavior 47 as the following diagram illustrates:

41. See generally Chayes & Chayes, supranote 16, at 179-80 (discussing the role of dispute
settlement in relations to treaty regimes and international adjudication).
42. See Koh, supranote 31, at 194-95 (discussing Koh's theory of obedience based on state
internalization of norms occurring as a part of the transnational legal process).
43. The distinction between legal vs. nonlegal process is important in IL but less so in IR. See
Raustiala & Slaughter, supra note 9, at 539 (discussing reasons why). See also Harold Hongju Koh,
TransnationalLegal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181, 184 (1996) (discussing the breakdown of this
barrier under the transnational legal process approach).
44. See Koh, supra note 44, at 183-84.
45. PHILLIPE SANDS, LAWLESS WoRLo 15-29 (2005) (documenting how international law has
changed in the past two decades and arguing that during the 1990's public perception of
international law transformed because globalization connected state interests, technological
innovation made information more accessible and more open to citizen scrutiny); see also ANNE
MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 31-34 (2004) (arguing that the traditional conceptual
lens of the unitary state is disaggregating because the increasingly important cast of international
actors are subcomponents of each state-individual government institutions like regulators,
judges, and legislators-are creating their own horizontal networks and even their own transgovernmental organizations that reach across borders).
46. See generally HIGGINS, supra note 12.
47. See Raustiala & Slaughter, supra note 9, at 545-48.
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III.

EXPANDING INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS THEORY THROUGH

IDR

International legal process theory has considered how various methods of law-making and problem solving affect state behavior. Yet, IDR is
a category of process that has been overlooked by international legal
scholars, despite rapid increase in its use. In order to account for the
full array of mechanisms in use today, international legal process
theory must be expanded. Understanding IDR's influence on states
requires understanding the culture of norms and principles that inform its theory and practice. This is challenging because the field of
20091
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dispute resolution lacks a well-defined and widely-accepted theoretical
foundation that connects the various types.4 8 Efforts to clarify are
further frustrated by the interdisciplinary nature of IDR and the
distinct vocabularies of different disciplines that comprise IDR. For
example, because much of the literature on peacemaking and international mediation is not grounded in international relations theory,
some argue that it suffers from conceptual confusion and lack of true
evidence. 49 Even within the field of international law there is no formal
or broadly recognized "law of international ADR."5 ° By necessity,
practitioners have developed codes of conduct and best practices for
international mediation and arbitration, sparking debate as to how
much formal guidance is necessary and recommended. In the absence
of a universal IDR5 1 theory, this Article relies on widely-accepted core
principles of IDR:
* Obligation to strive for peace and non-violence
" Right of self-determination
* Informed and voluntary participation
" Confidentiality
" Duty to participate in good faith
" Neutrality/impartiality of the mediator, facilitator, or other third
party
" Duty to disclose conflicts of interest by the mediator, facilitator, or
other third party
" Maximum inclusion by all stakeholders in the process
" Consensus building at all levels of the conflict
These core principles are not entirely novel nor are they unique to

48. Christer J6nsson, Diplomacy, Bargaining,and Negotiation, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS, supra note 9 at 212 (providing an overview of diplomacy, bargaining, and negotiation

theory and scholarship while noting that there is a not a generally accepted theoretical foundation
for these concepts).
49. Lilach Gilady & Bruce Russet, Peacemaking and Conflict Resolution, in HANDBOOK OF
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 9, at 392, 394-95 (discussing the limitations of current

research on international mediation and noting a need for theory based on understanding
international conflict and its management).

50. Id.
51. These core principles can be found embedded in the ethical requirements and Codes of
Conduct for mediators, arbitrators and other neutrals. See generally IMI CODE OF PROF'L CONDUCT
(2008), availableathttp://www.imimediation.org/code-professional-conduct-.html;

MODEL RuLEs

FOR MEDIATION (1998), availableat http://www.abanet.org/cpr/clientpro/mrmediation.pdf; AM.
ARB. ASS'N STATEMENT OF ETHIcAL PRINCIPLES, availableat http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id = 22036.
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the field of IDR, but they create a climate that induces states to willingly
and proactively collaborate to solve problems. The decision-making
paradigm shifts from power based on authority, strength and hierarchy
to power based on interests, cooperation and collaboration.5 2 These
principles are discussed in other disciplines using a different vocabulary. For example, Slaughter proposes similar organizing principles for
international relations. 53 Among others, she discusses Global Deliberative Equality to maximize participation by those most affected, which is
similar to the principle of maximum inclusion; Positive Comity or a
principle of affirmative cooperation, which is similar to the principle of
duty to participate in good faith; and Subsidiarity or locating governance at its lowest level, closest to those affected by its rules, which is
similar to consensus building.5 4 Holsti suggests that there are some
parallels to these principles in international law, including the right of
self rule, which is similar to the right of self-determination; nonviolence, which is similar to the obligation to use peaceful procedures;
and pacta sunt servanda, which correlates to the duty to participate in
good faith.5 5 The parallels between these principles in IDR and the
distinct fields of international law and international relations suggest
that all three fields are responding to the same conditions in the
international order.
The following section provides the necessary historical background
of IDR, describes the four categories addressed in this Article (negotiation, mediation, conciliation, and arbitration) and presents information documenting its current use.
A.

HistoricalBackground

Using international legal process to prevent war and foster peace
among nations has been an aim of international law since its inception.
Within this larger field, IDR holds a distinctive place. The First Hague
Peace Conference established an international framework for the
peaceful settlement of disputes between nations. 6 The Conference's
particular focus on process-the methods by which nations could
resolve disputes-led to the formalization of international arbitration

52. See generally WILLIAM

URY, GETTING TO PEACE: TRANSFORMING CONFLICT AT HOME, AT WORK

AND IN THE WORLD (1999).

53. SLAUGHTER, supra note 46, at 221.
54. Id.
55. K.J. HoLsTI, TAMING THE SOVEREIGNS:
174 (2004).
56. See Bercovitch, supranote 7, at 3.
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and mediation and the creation of the Permanent Court of Arbitration.5 7 In 1999, a century later, nations reconvened in The Hague to
58
discuss the future of international dispute settlement.
Yet, clarifying IDR's historical origins presents challenges because it
is a field that originates from a multitude of disciplinary perspectives.
There have been important contributions to this discipline from political scientists and IR scholars concerned with international conflict,
negotiation, diplomacy, and game theory. 59 Early IDR literature shared
interdisciplinary perspectives with IR, often because scholars focused
on both areas.6 ° Additional scholarship emerged after World War II
and the Cold War as the use of IDR became indispensable for diplomats. 61 High profile uses of IDR in intra-state and transnational disputes, such as the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, raised additional awareness about IDR.62
In the United States, use of IDR methods emerged from a motivation
to move away from the United States' competitive adversarial legal
model.6 3 Referred to as alternative dispute resolution (ADR), these
methods were used to address domestic legal disputes, not prevent war
between nations. Such thinking originated from a variety of disciplines
including law, political science, sociology, psychology and feminist
theory, 64 and predated World War II with early scholars such as Mary
Parker Follet writing about conflict resolution in the 1920s.65 The field

57. Id.

58. See Hague Appeal for Peace, When Did the Conference Take Place?, http://www.hague
peace.org/index.php?action= history&subAction = conf&selection =when (noting that the Third
Conference was held in the Hague in May 1999 and was a centennial commemoration on the
theme, "The Peaceful Settlement of Disputes: Prospects for the Twenty-First Century.").
59. Gilady & Russett, supra note 50, at 392-99.
60. See Louis Kriesberg, The Development of the Conflict Resolution Field, in PEACEMAKING IN
INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: METHODS AND TECHNIQUES 25, 66-68 (William Zartman & J. Lewis
Rasmussen eds., 1997) [hereinafter PEACEMAKING IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT] (noting the conver-

gence and complementarity between conflict resolution and international relations).
61. See id at 66-69 (providing an overview of theoretical changes and developments in
conflict resolution theory and practice and noting convergence between conflict resolution and
international relations).
62. See INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 67-90 (Saadia Touval & I. William
Zartman eds., 1985); see also ROGER FISHER ET AL., COPING WITH INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT: A
SYSTEMATIC APPROACH TO INFLUENCE IN INTERNATIONAL NEGOTIATION 225 (1997).

63. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Why Hasn't the World Gotten to Yes? An Appreciation and Some
Reflections, 4 NEGOT.J. 485, 489 (2006).

64. Kriesberg, supra note 61, at 60-63.
65. See id.at 52-53 (providing a comprehensive overview of early thinkers in conflict
resolution).
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began expanding rapidly in the U.S. in the 1980s with the addition of
Fisher and Ury's widely read Getting to Yes, Susskind's Consensus
Building Theory, game theorists like Raiffa, and international relations
scholars Touval and Zartman. 66 U.S. courts began to recognize and

support the use of mediation, arbitration, and other processes in
conjunction with and as alternatives to litigation.6 7 The American Bar
Association along with other bar associations also embraced the growing movement, forming the ABA Section of Dispute Resolution in
1993, promoting publications and hosting conferences in the field.
Professional organizations and rosters for arbitrators and mediators
began to appear as well.69
More recently, the United Nations, World Bank, and other international organizations have developed, redefined, and strengthened
existing IDR efforts. One prominent trend has been the exportation of
U.S. and Western-based models to developing countries in conjunction
with justice-based rule of law efforts led by development-oriented
institutions. 70 This trend raises important questions as to the role of
IDR as a replacement for traditional rule of law programs and the role
of individual rights. 71 In part because of the explosive growth in

international commercial dispute resolution, institutional and academic centers of dispute resolution are forming, especially in Asia
where places such as Singapore and Hong Kong72are emerging as hubs
for commercial dispute resolution in the region.
As the field continues to evolve, so does the scholarship. The first
generation of U.S.-based dispute resolution scholarship largely dealt
with emerging practices and methodologies of negotiation, mediation

66. Id. at 486.
67. See generally SARAH R. COLE, NANCY H. ROGERS & CRAIG A. McEWEN, MEDIATION: LAW,

Poucy, PRACtiCE app. C (2d ed. 1994) (listing state statues calling for mediation of disputes).
68. American Bar Association, About the ABA Section of Dispute Resolution, http://
www.abanet.org/dispute/aboutsec.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2009).
69. For example, see JAMS, founded in 1979. About JAMS, www.jamsadr.com/practices/
about.asp. Outside of the United States, similar fields ofstudywere emerging, notably in Australia,
South Africa and the United Kingdom.
70. Amy Cohen, Debatingthe Globalizationof U.S. Mediation:Politics,Power, andPracticein Nepal,
11 I-ARv. NEGOT. L. REV. 295 (2004).
71. See generallyJean R. Sternlight, Is Alternative Dispute Resolution Consistent with the Rule of
LawLessonsFrom Abroad, 56 DEPAutL L. REv. 569,569 (2007).
72. See Nicholas Fang, SingaporeAims to Be ArbitrationHubfor India, STRAITS TIMES (Sing.), May

8, 2008; Singapore Sports Council, Alternative Dispute Resolution Framework for Sports Formed
to Resolve Disputes, http://www.ssc.gov.sg/publish/Corporate/en/news/media-releases/2008/
alternative.dispute.html (noting developments that will increase Singapore's ability to serve as a
hub for sports-related dispute resolution).
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and arbitration with a normative focus on conflict resolution, as
opposed to prevention or management. 73 Today, IDR scholarship
often utilizes empirical studies and explores conflict systematically
through new tools such as dispute systems design.
B.

Defining and DescribinglDR

From a normative perspective, IDR differs from IR and IL in its
humanistic approach to international relations.74 The underlying assumption is that conflict in the international order stems from frustration, suppression, and denial of basic needs. 75 Therefore, the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict must address factors
beyond power, rights and the interests of states. IDR processes are
designed to serve as problem solving tools that can create outcomes
(rules, agreements, etc.) and build relations. 7 6 Because IDR is used in
both traditional legal contexts such as treaty negotiations and arbitrating international legal disputes and in non-legal settings as a decisionmaking tool to form policies, agreements and resolutions, the IDR
discipline does not share IL's legal and non-legal distinction. 7 7 It also
provides analysis regarding what actors want and how to influence what
they should want. 78 The need for this new approach is underscored by
the rapid expansion of IDR. 79 Because IDR supports voluntary compliance, it can also help address gaps in the compliance literature, such as

73. See GABRIELLA BLUM, ISLANDS OF AGREEMENT: MANAGING ENDURING ARMED RIVALRIES 36

(2007) (noting that resolution, not management or prevention, has been the focus of ADR
scholarship).
74. See Marieke Kleiboer, Great Power Mediation: Using Leverage to Make Peace?, in STUDIES IN
INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION, supra note 7, at 137.

75. Id.
76. CROCKER ET AL., TURBULENT PEACE, supranote 18, at 447-48.

77. This distinction is important in IL but less so in IR. SeeRaustiala & Slaughter, supranote 9,
at 539 (discussing reasons why); see also Koh, supra note 44, at 184 (discussing the breakdown of
this barrier under the transnational legal process approach).
78. Kal Raustiala, Refining the Limits of InternationalLaw, 34 GA.J. INT'L & Comp. L. 423, 436

(2006) (citing Barbara Koremenos et al., The RationalDesign of InternationalInstitutions,55 INT'L
ORG. 761, 726 (2001)) (setting forth the reasons why states care about international agreements
and organizations, and arguing that states care about institutional design because it affects
outcomes).
79. Scholars have observed that emerging new forms of governance require greater skills in
negotiation and collaboration. See, e.g., ROBERT AGRANOFF & MICHAEL McGuIRE, COLLABORATIVE
PUBLIC MANAGEMENT: NEW STRATEGIES FOR LOCAL GovERNMENTs (2003); Lisa Blomgren Bingham et
al., The New Governance: Practicesand Processesfor Stakeholder and Citizen Participationin the Work of
Government, 65 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 547 (2005); THE TooLS OF GOVERNMENT: A GUIDE TO THE NEW
GOVERNANCE (Lester M. Salamon ed., 2002).
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Franck's query as to why powerful states follow powerless rules. The
overview that follows introduces the general framework that IDR
processes follow and provides brief descriptions of the four IDR
methods covered in this Article (negotiation, mediation, conciliation,
and arbitration), which have been described in detail elsewhere.8 0
IDR Framework
A typical IDR process follows five core steps: 1) conflict assessment,
2) process design, 3) engagement, 4) conclusion of the process, 5)
implementation.
First, a conflict assessment is conducted to identify the desired
goal(s) (e.g., create a rule, form an agreement, or resolve a dispute);
the key stakeholders and their positions, interests, emotions, rights,
and identities; and the context (including geographical and cultural
information). Conflict assessment can be a formal process conducted
by a mediator or an informal process conducted by a stakeholder.
Stakeholder analysis8 1and conflict mapping are two tools often used in a
conflict assessment.
Conceptually, the conflict assessment stage serves a purpose similar
to discovery in a legal proceeding. Both steps uncover vital information
about the parties, conflicts, and facts. In IDR, this information informs
what process should be used and how it should be designed and
applied. For example, in a multilateral negotiation designed to form an
international agreement among nations, the secretariat or presiding
body will often meet with parties informally to map out areas of
potential agreement or discord before nations formally state positions
at the opening plenary. In this way, they help to coordinate interests,
operating much like mediators who converse with disputants before
bringing them together in ajoint session.
After the assessment phase, an IDR process must be designed to
achieve the desired goals within the given context. Referred to as
systems design, this step uses the information found during the conflict
assessment to strategically decide what IDR process or combination of
processes would best achieve the desired goal(s) given the stakehold-

80. For a comprehensive overview of these processes including definitions and use see
COLLIER & LowE, supra note 6, at 19-35. See alsoJ. L. BRIERLY, LAW OF NATIONS 373-76 (Sir

Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963) (discussing arbitration, mediation, conciliation, and good
offices).
81. See generallyWILIAM URY, GETInNG DispurEs RESOLVED (1988) (describing conflict assessment and applicable tools).

20091

GEORGETOWNJOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

ers, conflict, and context. For example, parties may decide to engage in
direct negotiations or in mediation with a provision for mandatory
arbitration should earlier efforts fail. By designing a system to process
disputes at various levels, conflicts are often averted or managed in
constructive ways. The- design phase is critical to achieving optimal
results.
The third step is to engage in the process. At this stage, considerations of stakeholder identity, timing and context come into play. For
example, the success of U.S. mediator Richard Holbrooke's efforts in
the Serbian-Kosovo conflict in November 1995 demonstrated the importance of some of these considerations.8 2 Holbrooke engaged the
parties and successfully mediated the dispute after earlier failed attempts by EU and UN mediators. Scholars believe that Holbrooke was
successful because of the following factors: timing (he mediated after
the parties failed to resolve the matter on their own) and mediator
identity (the skill, power, and clout Holbrooke had as an individual and
as an agent of the United States) .13 The factors that determine successful engagement of a process include the context of the conflict, nature
of the parties involved, timing, strategy, resources, and attributes of the
third-party neutral when applicable.8 4 The Holbrook example illustrates how factors surrounding the implementation of the chosen IDR
process can influence success or failure.
The fourth step is to conclude the process. Parties that have reached
a decision, whether a rule or an agreement, need to formalize and
document the terms and obligations set forth in that outcome. Outcomes can be binding or nonbinding and can take many forms,
including treaties, accords, or other international legal instruments.
When parties do not reach a decision, agreement, or resolution, it is
still important to conclude the process in order to clarify outcomes (or
lack thereof) and promote good relations among the parties.
IDR
85
process.
a
concluding
for
rituals
and
procedures
various
offers
The fifth and final step involves implementation. An implementation plan specifies a timeline for parties to uphold commitments and
obligations. Monitoring and reporting ensure that parties follow through
over time. Parties agree to return to negotiation or mediation if a party

82. See Kleiboer, supra note 75, at 127-28.
83. See id.
84. Jacob Bercovitch, Conclusion: Some Thoughts on the Process and Potential of Mediation, in
STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION, supra note 7, at 258, 261-62.
85. KENNETH CLOKE, CROSSROADS OF CONFiCr 181-83 (2006) (describing various techniques

for closing the mediation process, i.e., verbal acknowledgements).
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to the outcome fails to comply.
Understanding how a typical IDR process works provides a foundation for exploring the nuances of the actual processes themselves.
While this schematic highlights the general course of most IDR processes, specific cases do vary. The purpose of this outline is to provide
context for the overall IDR process design before describing specific
methods.
Types of IDR
There are many recognized forms of IDR. Common examples include negotiation, mediation, conciliation, good offices, shuttle diplomacy, and arbitration.8 6 In this Article, I specifically discuss four: 1)
negotiation, 2) mediation, 3) conciliation and 4) arbitration.
Negotiation is a process by which parties engage in direct dialogue in
order to make a decision, reach an agreement, or deal with a dispute.
During a negotiation, parties may engage in bargaining. In the interstate context, diplomats often begin formal negotiations with an official statement of their countrys' cleared positions. The mutual-gains
theory of negotiation encourages bargaining based on interests, not
positions.8 7 Instead of focusing on positions, or what a party wants, the
goal is to focus on the interests and describe why the party wants
something. Interest-based communication takes place in a culture
emphasizing coordination and sharing of preferences through collaboration, thus allowing parties to maximize their outcomes through value
creation. 88 Negotiation theory encourages actors to separate the people
from the problem. This allows participants to gain emotional perspective and enhance clarity. Studies have shown that people are prone to
developing inattentional blindness during conflicts or in competitive
environments, effectively blinding them to objective reality. 89 Negotia-

86. For a comprehensive overview of these processes including definitions and use, see
COLLIER & LowE, supranote 6, at 38.
87. See ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING To YES 40-54 (2d ed. 1981).
88. Id. at 56-57; see also CROCKER ET AL., TURBULENT PEACE, supranote 18, at 447-48.
89. See, e.g., Daniel J. Simons & Christopher F. Chabris, Gorillas in our Midst: Sustained
InattentionalBlindnessforDynamicEvents, 28 PERCEPTION 1059 (1999) (discussing experiment where
people who viewed a video of a basketball game were asked to count the number of passes made by
one team while a woman in a gorilla costume walks into the middle of the basketball game for nine
seconds before departing). Prof Richard Wiseman of the University of Hertfordshire recreated
the experiment with a live audience and only 10% of the audience saw the gorilla. Roger
Highfield, Did You See the Gorilla?,TELEGRAPH (London), May 11, 2004, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/

connected/main.jhtml?xml = %2Fconnected%2F2004%2F05%2F05%2Fecfgorilla05.xml.
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tion theory addresses this phenomenon by educating participants
about the dangers of assuming their perceptions of a situation are
accurate. When states do not assume that their truth is an objective
truth, they are more likely to engage in information sharing and other
behaviors that lead to increased participation and coordination. In
addition to these theories, there is a vast literature that addresses
negotiation strategies, tactics, timing, and context. 90 Because negotiation involves direct engagement between parties, it is often the first
form of IDR that is tried. However, when negotiations fail, states turn to
other IDR processes.
The other forms of IDR-mediation, conciliation, and arbitrationshare an important factor: they employ the assistance of a neutral third
party to facilitate the process. In the international context, mediation
can be understood as a voluntary and non-coercive process whereby an
impartial third party helps states reach an agreement and repair
relations. 9 1 Although this definition represents the ideal, mediation
can take many forms and the distinctions between mediation and other
methods (shuttle diplomacy, good offices, consultations, etc.) are often
blurred in practice.9 2 The hallmarks of mediation include voluntary
participation and agreement by the parties, impartiality of the mediator, confidentiality, and a right to self-determination, although these
elements are not practical or possible in every situation. Mediation can
lead to agreements that can be both binding and nonbinding in
nature. Binding agreements are formed through explicit consent of
the signatories, and can be treated as an international legal instrument
like a treaty, or as a contract. Mediation can promote cooperative and
horizontal decision-making. 3 There are several styles of mediation,
including facilitative, elicitive, transformative, and evaluative. Choosing
an appropriate style is context-dependent. For a mediator who engages
heads of state, a facilitative style may be appropriate when the mediation is more a formality and the parties are capable of direct dialogue.

90. See generally THE NEGOTIATION PROCESS: THEORIES AND APPLICATIONS (I. William Zartman,
ed. 1978); Daniel Druckman, Negotiating in the InternationalContext, in PEACEMAKING IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT, supra note 61, at 81-115; JEANNE M. BRETr, NEGOTIATING GLOBALLY: HOW TO
NEGOTIATE DEALS, RESOLVE DIsPuTEs AND MAKE DECISIONS ACROSS CULTURAL BOUNDARIES (2nd ed.

2007).

91. For definitions of mediation and similar processes including good offices, seeThe Hague
Conventions of 1899 and 1907; U.N. Charter art. 33, para. 1; COLI.ER & LOwE, supra note 6, at
27-31.
92. See COLLIER & LowE, supra note 6, at 28-29 (offering instances where the SecretaryGeneral offered his good offices and the UNSC definition of good offices).
93. Bercovitch, supranote 85, at 258.
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However, empirical studies suggest that structured and firm approaches are generally more effective. 94 Mediating a multilateral border dispute involving many parties may require a more structured and
firm evaluative style. Historical case studies offer insight into what style
works best in different situations, but ultimately the mediator decides.
Mediation, as well as shuttle diplomacy, good offices, and other
informal methods, has commonly been used to settle treaty disputes
such as the Pact of the League of Arab States; Charter of the Organization of African Unity of 1964, and the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 and
boundary matters like the Beagle Channel dispute between Chile and
Argentina regarding the ownership of island territory. 95 Pope John
Paul II used mediation to resolve the matter after arbitration failed.9 6
Mediation has also been used by states in political disputes, for instance
in the Chaco War between Bolivia and Uruguay, in India-Pakistan
disputes over Kashmir, and in the Iran-U.S. hostage crisis.9 7 Mediation
raises contextual variables (the nature of the dispute, parties and their
relationships, and characteristics of the mediator) and process variables (strategies and tactics employed) 9 8 that must be carefully considered. The identity of the mediators and the timing of the mediation are
also important components. Studies suggest that powerful mediators
who enjoy legitimacy based on affiliation with a powerful country or
international organization are most effective when disputants lack
sufficient motivation to reach resolution. 99 Private mediators who are
lay people or who are operating without the backing of an influential
entity can be effective in circumstances where parties require enhanced communication, optimism, or a reality check. 10 0 Zartman,
Rubin and other scholars have debated various theories of ripeness
about the appropriate timing for a mediator to intervene. T10 Despite
the lack of consensus about identity, timing, and other factors, the
importance of assessing each conflict scenario before intervening is

94. Jacob Bercovitch & Allison Houston, Influence of Mediator Characteristicsand Behavior on the
Success of Mediation in InternationalRelations, 37 INT'LJ. CONFLICr MGMT. 670-91 (1993).

95. See COLLIER & LowE, supra note 6, at 28-29.
96. Id. at 27-28.
97. Id.

98. J6nsson, supranote 49, at 221.
99. See Pruitt, supra note 21, at 51 (citing Thomas Princen, Mediation by a Transnational
Organization:The Case of the Vatican, in MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS (Jacob Bercovitch &
Jeffrey Rubin, eds., 1992)).
100. Id.
101. Karin Aggestam, Quasi-Informal Mediation in the Oslo Channel: Larsen and Holst as
IndividualMediators, in STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION, supranote 7, at 69-71.
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well-recognized. 102
Conciliation also involves third-party neutrals who assist parties in
resolving disputes. 10 3 In conciliation, the neutral may shuttle back and
forth between parties that are in different locations or over a'period of
time. Conciliation has historical roots in Asia and remains popular in
Japan due to its non-confrontational format that fosters face-saving and
has been used for centuries in private and land disputes. 10 4 In France
during the 1920s and 1930s, conciliation was used in social conflicts
that fell outside the judicial arena or when gaps existed in the Civil
Code. 10 5 In practice, the distinction between conciliation and mediation is often blurred as there is no globally-accepted consensus on the
exact differentiation between the two methods.
Arbitration is a formal process where parties submit decision-making
authority to the arbitrators who make binding determinations about
rights and assets based on the legal and factual merits of a dispute?0 °6
Because participants voluntarily give up the ability to determine their
own outcomes, arbitration is classified as the least collaborative of the
IDR methods. Arbitration is an effective tool for those seeking settlement agreements, but is less useful for contexts requiring deeper
resolution and reconciliation because it is not designed to elicit and
address the identity or emotional aspects of a conflict. Domestically,
arbitration is considered a form of ADR because it is an alternative to
litigation. This alternative paradigm does not exist in the international
context, where arbitration is considered to be a primary adjudicative
forum for resolving international legal disputes, particularly in the
commercial, investment, and trade sectors where it is used for interstate, mixed-state, and private disputes.' 0 7 Unlike the other methods of
IDR, arbitration enjoys an institutionalized enforcement framework

102. See Lawrence Susskind & Jennifer Thomas-Larmer, Conducting a Conflict Assessment, in
LAWRENCE SUSSKIND ET AL., THE CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK 99, 101-06 (1999).
103. For an in-depth discussion of conciliation, see COLLIER & LOWE, supra note 6, at 29-31; see
alsoUNITED NATIONS, HANDBOOK ON THE PEACEFUL SETTLEMENTS OF DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES 45-55
(1999);J.G. MERRILLS, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 64-90 (4th ed. 2005).
104. YASUNOBU SATO, COMMERCIAL DISPUTE PROCESSING AND JAPAN 280 (1999).

105. Id. at 281.
106. COLLIER & LOWE, supra note 6, at 38-40 (giving a general overview and specifically
noting the rise of mixed arbitrations since World War I and the creation of new mechanisms for
dispute prevention and management (not just resolution) by the Organization on Security and
Co-operation Dispute Settlement Mechanism in 1991 and the Organization of African Unity's
Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution created in 1993).
107. See id. at 47 (noting the creation of the International Chamber of Commerce in 1919,
which has housed thousands of arbitrations supervised by the International Court of Arbitration).
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through treaties such as the United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (known as the New
York Convention a0 8) that enforce participation in and compliance with
arbitration agreements. 10 9 International arbitrations are often conducted through institutions that have preset procedures and structures, for instance the International Chamber of Commerce and the
UNCITRAL rules, which serve to make arbitral agreements reliably and
uniformly enforceable in national courts.1 10 The binding nature of
international arbitration makes it an attractive option, especially to
private entities, because of institutionalized enforcement mechanisms
such as the New York Convention."' The most prominent use of
arbitration for inter-state matters is the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal,
which was established in response to the Iran hostage crisis as a
mechanism for resolving outstanding legal claims between two nations
that had severed diplomatic ties. 112 However, as this case has demonstrated, arbitration is limited in its ability to resolve political disputes as
11
a part of the formal process."
C.

Rise of lDR

In addition to understanding the origins and categories of IDR, it is
important to recognize its increased use by states and non-state actors
around the world. Although the focus of this Article is on state use of
international legal process, particularly IDR, this section includes data
documenting the rise in use among non-state actors and for private and
intra-state uses. The overall trend indicates that actors everywhere are
seeking new tools for decision-making and problem-solving or are
using old tools in new ways. Possible reasons behind this trend are that
existing forms of international legal process are not serving the needs
of states so they are using new tools, states turn to IDR when other

108. United Nations Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards, openedfor signatureJune10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
109. RuFus V. RHOADES ET AL., PRACTITIONER'S HANDBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION AND
MEDIATION 102-05 (2d ed. 2007) (noting that national laws like the FSIA where Congress provides
an exception to state immunity from judicial proceedings so that courts can enforce an arbitration
agreement where the arbitration is to take place in the U.S. or is governed by a treaty, i.e., the New
York Convention).
110. See id. at 103.
111. See COLLUER & LowE, supranote 6, at 45--46.
112. Id. at 73-74 (citing G. H. ALDRICH, THEJURISPRUDENCE OF THE IRAN-UNITED STATES CLAIMS
TRIBUNAL (1996)).

113. See RHOADES ET AL., supra note 110, at 105.
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options fail, or IDR "works" as measured by achieving outcomes or
compliance. Similar trends can be found within states. In the United
States, for example, the increase of ADR has often paralleled the
decline of litigation, suggesting that parties are using ADR tools in lieu
of litigation. 1 4 While this explanation cannot be extrapolated to the
international legal system, it does suggest that states may be seeking out
forms of problem-solving processes more often than in the past,
particularly given the rise in international adjudication.' 15
Nations employ negotiation, mediation, conciliation, and arbitration
at the international level to prevent wars, make peace, manage relations, and solve problems. Documentation of IDR use at this level,
particularly compliance with agreements and other long-term outcomes is scarce. The sources that do exist come primarily from political
scientists and various institutes that track IDR for research or marketing purposes. Such scarcity can be attributed to political sensitivity,
need for confidentiality, and the lack of resources for research. 116 A few
studies do suggest that IDR usage at this level is on the rise. A study
documenting 310 international conflicts occurring between 1945 and
1974 found that mediation was used in 82% of the cases.1 17 Another
study found that 45% of 94 post-World War II international disputes
employed mediation, further noting that 71% of the mediations resulted in partially successful outcomes."" A third study cites that
mediation was used in 60% of 241 conflicts between 1945 and 1990.1 19

114. See Thomas J. Stipanowich, ADR and 'The Vanishing Trial' What We Know and What We

Don't, DiSP. RESOL.

MAG.,

Summer 2004, at 7 (suggesting that the use of ADR may reduce

litigation); see also Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, The Strange Success of Tort Reform, 53 EMORY

L.J. 1225 (2004) (noting the decrease in filings in Texas as well as other states); Deborah R.
Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves:How the AlternativeDisputeResolution Movement is Re-ShapingOurLegal
System, 108 PENN. ST. L. REv. 165, 166-67 (2003).
115. See Cesare P.R. Romano, The Proliferationof InternationalJudicialBodies: The Pieces of the
Puzzle, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 79 (1999); see also Cesare P.R. Romano, The Shift from the
Consensualto the Compulsory Paradigmin InternationalAdjudication:Elements for a Theory of Consent, 39
N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 792, 794 (2007).
116. MICHAEL S, LUND, PREVENTING VIOLENT CONFLICT 84-85 (1997).
117. Jacob Bercovitch, Mediation in InternationalConflicts: Theory, Practice,and Developments, in
PEACEMAKING IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT, supra note 61, at 131 (citing ROBERT L. BuTTERWORTH,
MANAGING INTERSTATE DISPUTES, 1945-1974 (1976); KALEWiJ. HoLsTr, INTERNATIONAL POLrrCs: A
FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSIS (1983)).
118. Id. (citingHOLsTi, supranote 118).
119. Id. (citing Jacob Bercovitch, UnderstandingMediation's Role in Preventive Diplomacy, 12
NEGOTIATION J. 241, 241-59 (1996)); see also Jacob Bercovitch & Allison Houston, The Study of
InternationalMediation: TheoreticalIssues & EmpiricalEvidence, in RESOLVING INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS: THE THEORYAND PRACTICE OF MEDIATION 11, 11 (Jacob Bercovitch ed., 1996).
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An empirical study by Bercovitch documenting the increased use of
available international conflict management processes-multilateral
conferences, referrals to international organizations, arbitration, negotiation, and mediation-showed that all categories enjoyed overall
increases in use between 1949 and 1995, the period of the study.12 °
However, the more collaborative processes of negotiation and mediation had the highest increases in growth rates between 1966 and 1995,
with mediation growing the most.1 2 1 This study suggests that mediation

and negotiation are the IDR methods most preferred by states, and that
these processes have become significantly more popular over the past
twenty years. The creation of organizations that use IDR to prevent and
manage disputes, such as the Organization on Security and Cooperation Dispute Settlement Mechanism created in 1991122 and the
Organization of African Unity's Mechanism for Conflict Prevention,
Management, and Resolution created in 1993, support this proposition.123 Yet, research comparing a variety of IDR processes is rare.12 4
Instead, most studies focus on growth occurring within a single area of
IDR, particularly arbitration and mediation, or by category, e.g., international commercial disputes or political disputes.
Nations also utilize IDR through international and regional organizations. From 1945-1995, more than 50% of all documented inter-state
125
mediations were conducted by regional organizations or the UN.
These organizations were sought out to mediate because of state
perceptions about the legitimacy, moral authority and clearly identifiable norms of the mediating organizations. They had no power over
states in the traditional sense and no legal enforcement mechanisms at
their disposal.

120. See generally JACOB BERCOVITCH & JUDITH FRETTER, REGIONAL GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL

1945 TO 2003 (2004).
121. Seeid.
122. COLLIER & LOwE, supra note 6, at 39-40.
123. CROCKER ET AL., TURBULENT PEACE, supranote 18, at 574-75.
124. See Cohen, supranote 71, at 312 n.4 7 (citing Anthony Wanis-St.John, ImplementingADR
in TransitioningStates: Lessons Learnedfrom Practice,5 HAtv. NEGOT. L. R. 339, 343 (2000)) (noting
common methods for evaluation of IDR processes, including surveys and case studies. For
example, in the United States, studies evaluating the success of mediation have focused on
reporting the number of cases resolved, financial savings to the parties, and participant satisfaction.). For a discussion of the limitations in international mediation and peacemaking research
related to the study of violent conflicts, see Gilady & Russett, supranote 50, at 405.
125. Bercovitch, supra note 85, at 261; see also Jacob Bercovitch & Paul Diehl, Conflict
Management on EnduringRivalries: The Frequency, Timing and Short Term Impact of Mediation, 22 INT'L
INTERAcIONS 299-320 (1997).
CONFLICT AND MANAGEMENT FROM
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The United Nations serves an increasingly important role in managing relations between states. State requests for UN Security Council
(UNSC) 126 assistance in resolving conflicts is on the rise. Prior to 1990,
the UNSC adopted enforcement mechanisms in only two situationsthe arms embargo against South Africa (resulting in a successful Truth
and Reconciliation Commission) and the trade embargo against Southern Rhodesia (present-day Zimbabwe) .127 During the 1990-2008 period, the UNSC has adopted sanctions again Iraq, Libya, the former
Yugoslavia, Somalia, Liberia, Rwanda, Angola, and Haiti.1 28 Such assistance employs enforcement-based elements that have led to successful
IDR processes. UN peacekeepers operate to assist with conflict prevention and management. They use the tools of coercion and mediation
together to enforce peace, pre-empt further violence lnd resolve
conflict. 129 Peacekeepers are often effective because they enjoy the
legitimacy of their respective organizations and engage for humanitarian, strategic, security and political reasons. 130 In March 2008, the UN
announced the formation of the UN Mediation Standby Team, a
rapid-response team of highly-skilled international mediators housed
.under the UN Department of Political Affairs. 3 ' Efforts to mediate
domestic crises to prevent regional or global spillover effects are also
common, especially when legalized enforcement mechanisms fail. For
example, in February of 2008, the State Department announced its
support for the mediation efforts of former UN Secretary-General Kofi
13 2
Anan in the Kenyan crisis after the failure of negotiations.
Although less relevant for this Article's focus on state behavior, the
rise in mixed-state commercial arbitrations parallels the overall trend.
Mixed-state arbitrations have been rising progressively since World War
1133 and there has been significant growth in the use of international

126. Cameron R. Hume, A Diplomat'sView, in PEACEMAKING IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT, supra

note 61, at 322-23 (describing the UNSC as a political and legislative forum that focuses on
decision making via negotiations where the council acts as a diplomatic emergency room).
127. Id. at 320.
128. Id.
129. Bercovitch, supra note 85, at 261.
130. See CROCKER ET AL., TuRBuLENT PEACE, supranote 18, at 27-41.
131. Geoff Sharp, UIN Announces New 'On-Call' Mediation Team, http://www.mediate.comi/
articles/SharpGbl20080310B.cfm.
132. TED DAGNE, CONG. RES. SERV., KENYA: THE DECEMBER 2007 ELECTIONS AND THE CHALLENGES AHEAD 2 (2008) (noting that twelve senior government officials and opposition members
from Kenya have reportedly been banned from entering the U.S. by the State Department).
133. See COLLIER & LOwE, supra note 6, at 38.
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arbitration for commercial cases in recent years.'3 In fact, eleven
major international arbitration institutions1 35 reported that annual
case filings nearly doubled, from 1,392 cases per year in 1993 to 2,628
cases per year in 2001.36 The World Bank's International Centre for
Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), which uses arbitration and
conciliation to settle investment disputes, reported three cases in 1994,
106 in 2004, and a record high of 130 in 2007.137 In 2007, 599 new cases
were filed with the ICC International Court of Arbitration from over
126 countries, "a figure unprecedented in the Court's 85-year history."13 8 This suggests that states and private actors are increasing their

use ofcommercial arbitration, perhaps for some of the same reasons
they are drawn to inter-state IDR.
Growth in non-state actor use of IDR is also increasing. In the United
States, the significant reduction in federal jury trials has been welldocumented and attributed to the increased use of dispute resolution 139 and the increased rate of voluntary settlements. 140 The American Arbitration Association reported a 17% increase in its international
case load, and other studies report similar increases and predictions

134. Richard W. Naimark & Stephanie E. Keer, Post-AwardExperience in InternationalCommercial Arbitration, DIsp. REs.

J.,

Feb.-Apr. 2005, at 95 (citing KLAus PETER BERGER, INTERNATIONAL

n.62 (1993) (stating that "About 90% of international economic
contracts contain an arbitration clause."))
135. The reporting institutions are: American Arbitration Association; China International
Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission; Hong Kong International Arbitration Centre;
International Chamber of Commerce; Japan Commercial Arbitration Association; Korean Commercial Arbitration Board; Kuala Lumpur Regional Centre for Arbitration; London Court of
International Arbitration; Singapore International Arbitration Centre; Arbitration Institute of the
Stockholm Chamber of Commerce; and British Columbia International Commercial Arbitration
Centre.
136. Christopher Drahozal, Arbitration &y the Numbers: The State of Empirical Research on
InternationalCommercialArbitration,22 ARB. INT'L 291, 299 -300 (2006).
137. News from ICSID (Int'l Ctr. for Settlement of Inv. Disp., Wash., D.C.), Winter 2007, at
20-21 (reporting statements by Secretary-General, ICSID Ana Palacio noting arbitration's increased role in public policy and international law matters).
138. See Record Year for ICC Court in 2007, http://www.iccwbo.org/iccbihfi/index.html.
139. David Azar, Association for Conflict Resolution, Conflict Resolution Reduces the
Number of Federal Cases Decided by Juries, http://acrnet.org/acrlibrary/more.php?id=
P10_10__0_C.
140. The Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007: Hearing on S. 1782 Before the S. Subcomm. on the
Constitution of the S. Judiciay Comm., l10th Cong. (2007) (statement of Richard Naimark, Senior
Vice President, American Arbitration Association) (noting that the American Arbitration Association reports that 58% of consumer cases before the AAA in 2006 reached a voluntary settlement).
ECONOMIC ARBITRATION 8 &
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that the growth will continue.14 In Japan, there is a preference toward
consensus-building dispute resolution methods such as mediation and
conciliation over litigation due to cultural preferences for options that
are more collaborative and less divisive. 142 In China, there are over six
million mediators and 950,000 People's Mediation Committees nationwide that resolve over seven million disputes annually. 143 The China
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC)
estimates that more than half of the international arbitration cases
before the Commission are resolved through conciliation and
88% of
1
domestic arbitration cases are resolved through mediation. "
As the use of IDR processes continues to grow, data about use will
become more readily available. Empirical data about IDR is not as
prevalent on the public international side as it is on the private side,
largely due to commercially-driven reporting demands of institutions
that facilitate private IDR. Reporting on the frequency of use of IDR
processes is often conducted by IDR service providers or coordination
bodies that cater to commercial and other private matters. Data on
arbitration is also more common than other forms of IDR, perhaps due

141. See Stephen K. Huber & E. Wendy Trachea-Huber, InternationalADR in the 1990's: The
Top Ten Developments, 1 Hous. Bus. & TAX L.J. 184, 219-20 (discussing the explosive growth in
international mediation defined broadly to include conciliation and other voluntary processes);
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ANNUAL REPORT (1999),

available at http://www.adr.org

(reporting that the American Arbitration Association's international case load increased by 17%
in. 1999 "with two trends in evidence-an increasing number of cases that have no U.S.-based
participants and the size of the average claim is increasing"); George H. Friedman, American
Arbitration Association Initiatives: Looking Toward the New Millennium, 6 METRO. CORP. COUNS., 29
(1998). Car-men Collar Fernandez & Jerry Spolter, InternationalIntellectual PropertyDispute Resolution: Is Mediation a Sleeping Giant, 53 Disp. RESOL.J. 62, 68 (1998) (predicting that the importance
of international mediation will increase because "it is traditional to use conciliation as a
mechanism to resolve domestic and labor matters and civil disputes of all types" in Asia and
because "40% of the U.S. exports are made to Asian countries"); Julie Barker, International
Mediation:A Better Alternativefor the Resolution of CommercialDisputes: Guidelines for a U.S. Negotiator
Involved in an InternationalCommercialMediation with Mexicans, 19 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 1,
21-22 (1996) (predicting the increasing importance of international mediation because "Naphtha's dispute resolution mechanisms encourage consensus and collaboration over speed of
resolution" and because "mediation is ideally suited to achieve many of these goals").
142. Frank Upham, Mythmaking in the Rule-of-Law Orthodoxy, in Promotingthe Rule of Law Abroad
(Carnegie, Paper No. 34Jan. 2003) at 32; see a/soJohn Owen Haley, The Politics ofInformalJustice:
The Japanese Experience 1922-1942, in THE POLITICs OF INFORMAL JUSTICE, VOL. 2: COMPARATIVE

STUDIES 125 (Richard Abel ed., 1982) (providing another account of the Japanese attempt to
replace litigation with conciliation).
143. JAMES ZIMMERMAN, CHINA LAW DESKBOOIC A LEGAL GUIDE FOR FOREIGN-INVESTED ENTERPRISES 834 (ABA ed., 2005) (citing CivilDisputeMediation Committees (BBC Oct. 19, 1991)).
144. Id. at 835.
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to the absence of negotiation- or mediation-centric organizations that
exist for arbitration, like the WTO's Dispute Settlement Body and
ICSID, which collect and publish data. Collecting data on long-term
compliance behavior for IDR is challenging because of high costs, lack
of established measurement criteria, and its time-consuming nature.
IV. IDR AND

STATE BEHAVIOR: LINKING PROCESS TO COMPLIANCE

The first two central claims of this Article have been presented: that
international legal process theory offers a comprehensive analytical
framework for describing and analyzing state behavior, and that in
order to remain accurate international legal process theory must be
expanded to include the other kinds of processes states use. This
section applies the analytical framework to describe the interplay
between IDR and the factors and tools that influence state behavior.
IDR's unique influence on states, particularly its ability to foster compliance with international law, is then examined.
A.

Analyzing How DR Affects State Behavior

This section explores how IDR uniquely advances criteria that influence state behavior and describes how IDR has the potential to foster
greater state compliance with international law. Given the vast number
of possible elements, in-depth analysis of any one element remains the
aim of future work. For purposes of this analysis, factors refer to the
elements that constitute state behavior and tools refer to the mechanisms through which behavior can be influenced. This analysis considers the impact on both on state actors as well as the individuals that
represent states. Although the focus here is on IDR, this framework
could be used to analyze other processes.
1. Through Factors: Interests, Identity, Rights, Legitimacy,
Reputation, Emotions
Interests

International law primarily considers the rational interests of state
actors. This disqualifies the interests of other important stakeholders
like non-state actors or unrecognized political entities. It also fails to
consider the wider range of interests that affect decision-making, such
as emotional factors. The approach in IDR is different. IDR facilitates
the inclusion of more parties' interests into the process. During the
conflict assessment phase, all of the stakeholders' interests are exam2009]
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ined, including parties that are not at the table. Inclusion of traditionally unrecognized actors allows for a more comprehensive and accurate
assessment of goals and problems, which improves process design. IDR
also widens the scope of interests that may be considered by analyzing
all of the potential interests that form an asserted position. These
include rational interests, but also interests that are based on needs,
identity, and a host of other factors. Recognizing that emotions and
personalities play an important role in behavior, IDR processes elicit
the emotional aspects of human nature that international legal processes often discourage. IDR recognizes that nations are ultimately
represented by individuals, so a process designed to address the complexity of human nature will be more effective at influencing state
behavior. These aspects of IDR are intentional. IDR processes are
structured to induce collaborative bargaining in order to achieve
outcomes that provide mutual gains. 145 IDR literature has shown how
parties can achieve more optimal outcomes through engaging in a
mutual gains approach rather than a traditional hard bargaining
approach to negotiation. IDR's benefits have been documented in
places such as Nepal where IDR's success has been attributed to its
ability to embrace the full set of needs and interests of those involved in
problem-solving, to deal with legal and non-legal matters and to
146
provide for contextual sensitivity.
IDR offers techniques for eliciting information about state interests.
Mediators or conciliators utilize tools to encourage diplomats and
decision-makers to think beyond their original positions to the underlying interests and needs. Mediators may use reality testing to help
parties affirm what is essential to reaching an agreement. The formal
process of mediation, its confidentiality, and its face-saving attributes
encourages parties to coordinate information and seek resolution. At
the person-to-person level, mediators may use acknowledgement, reframing and caucusing to facilitate more honest negotiation between
parties and to move the discussion toward emotional concerns that
often block rational thinking. Even direct negotiations can benefit
from a third party that facilitates the exchange of information about
positions and interests using tools of convening, the single-text ap-

145. FISHER & URY, supranote 88, at 10-11.
146. Cohen, supra note 71, at 353; see also Laura Nader, The Recurrent Dialectic between Legality
and Its Alternatives: The Limitationsof Binary Thinking, 132 U. PA. L. Ray. 621, 644 (1984) (reviewing
JEROLD S. AuERaAcH,Jusnc WITHouT LAw? (1983)).
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proach, and stakeholder identification.1 4 7 Negotiation uses coordination and acculturation to shape interests and form outcomes with
which parties want to comply. Negotiation has been used to achieve
secondary compliance when a party to an international court case
refused to comply. 148 In Lena Goldfields, a noncompliant Soviet Union
until the matter was raised during
refused to follow the court's award
14 9
trade negotiations with the UK
In order for peace agreements and other deals to last in the interstate conflict setting, an arrangement must address the needs and
interests of as many of the stakeholders as possible and account for
changes in the future. Crocker, Hampson, and Aall call this "reaching
out" and "reaching down." 150 Decision-makers who are at the table
forming and ultimately. reaching agreements must work to ensure that
the groups they represent, in some cases domestic constituents, are
informed and engaged so that their needs will be considered by the
agreement. This component, although not easy, is possible and essential to ensuring long-lasting compliance, as is demonstrated by Cambodia's peace process in the early 1990s, which included representatives
from the UNSC in addition to regional and local groups. Another
example is the 1988 Namibia-Angola settlement, which was structured
to include not only parties to the conflict, but also outside stakeholders
would ultimately be essential
whose participation in the peace 15process
1
to achieving successful outcomes.

147. See Lawrence Susskind, An Alternative to Robert's Rules of Orderfor Groups, Organizations,
and Ad Hoc Assemblies That Want to Operate by Consensus, in CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK, supra

note 103, at 3, 33, for a detailed description of these facilitation tools. The single-text approach is a
tool used to create agreement through the collective revision of one document. Stakeholder
identification is a strategy for identifying representative stakeholders and the intensity in which
they should engage in the process.
148. See COLLIER & LOwE, supra note 6, at 264.
149. Id.; see alsoV.V. Veeder, The Lena Goldfields Arbitration:The HistoricalRoots of Three Ideas, 47
INT'L & COMI'. L.Q. 747 (1998); Arthur Nussbaum, The Arbitration Between the Lena Goldfields, Ltd.
and the Soviet Government, 36 CORNELL L.Q. 31, 36-37, available at http://tldb.uni-koeln.de/php/
pub.showscontent.php?page=pub-show-document.php&pubdocid= 127500&pubwithtoc=ja&
pubwithmeta=ja&pubmarkid =959000.
150. CHESrER A. CROCKER ET AL., TAMING INTRAcrABLE CONLirs: MEDIATION IN THE HARDEST
CASES 178-84 (2004) [hereinafter CROCKER, TAMING INTRAcrABLE CoNFurCrs].
151. Id. at 179 (noting the need to include international, regional, and domestic interest
groups in the agreement-formation process in order to make the settlement "stick" and offering
process design suggestions to do this).

2009]

GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Identity

Identity considerations play an important role in influencing behavior. Identity is the image a state has about itself and projects into the
world. 15 2 States are considered small or large depending on their
political and economic resources. 1 53 Labeling a state (e.g., authoritarian or democratic) shapes perspectives about its intentions and motivations and affects how leaders will engage in cooperative problemsolving.15 4 Identity can be a source of conflict, as demonstrated by the
genocide that occurred in Rwanda. Yet it can also be a source of
resolution. In Northern Ireland, mediators helped the parties move
past identity-based conflict by creating a vision of a future joint identity
with increased economic incentives. 155
The identity of individuals involved in state use of IDR is also
relevant. For instance, before the U.S. government enters into treaty
negotiations, hundreds of people within various government agencies
must work through an inter-agency process to formalize the U.S.
position. While this is state behavior, it also involves sustained interaction among individuals, who form relationships with one another.
Thus, how people work together in a process, as well as the distinct
identities of the people involved, ultimately affects the outcome. Our
perceptions and preferences are filtered through who we are. Culture,
age, gender, family background, and religion arejust a few of the many
factors that form identity and affect perception. 1 56 IDR helps bring
these complexities to the surface. During the assessment phase, parties
deconstruct their positions, interests, and underlying identity considerations, allowing participants to develop informed perceptions about
their own identities as well as those of their counterparts. By breaking
the analysis down to this elemental level, parties become aware of how
these elements are contributing to their interests and ultimately to
their decisions. Fact-finding and fact-sharing help parties become
aware of how these elements are shaping others' outcomes. By doing

152. CROCKER ET AL., TAMING INTRAcrABLE CoNFLicrs, supra note 151, at 191; see alsoJames M.
Goldgeier, The Role of Political Psychology in Rethinking Security Studies (unpublished paper)
(1997) (discussing the condition under which identity and violence are related, e.g. violence
between Hutus and Tutsis in Rwanda).

153. CROCKER ET AL., TuRBuLENT PEACE, supranote 18, at 11.
154. Id. at 191.
155. Id. at 788, 792.
156. SeeAsher Alkoby, Theoriesof Compliancewith InternationalLaw and the Challenge of Cultural
Difference, 4 J. INT'L L. & INT'L REL. 151, 166 (describing the interplay between culture and
identity).
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so, a party that has shifted from interest-based decision-making into
identity-based decision-making can reengage in an informed and constructive way. IDR helps parties set realistic expectations and promotes
satisfaction with the process-factors essential to motivating voluntary
compliance. For example, during the conflicts that surrounded Nambia's movement toward independence in the late 1980's, mediation
and negotiation were used to end hostilities and pave the way toward
independence in 1990.157 IDR was successful for the following reasons:

the mediator, being from the United States, had leverage, used a
negotiating strategy that integrated stakeholder interests and rights
into the process, and had sufficient and long-term resources. The
mediation process also included a national reconciliation process
designed to promote forgiveness and nation-building, which changed
parties' behavior because it helped people reframe their identities and
thus change the dynamic of the conflict. Victims and perpetrators were
humanized. The IDR process was designed to encourage people to see
each other as individuals, allowing them to coordinate interests, stimulate empathy, and promote reconciliation. This example illustrates how
IDR can be used effectively to influence identity.
Rights

Legal systems aspire to protect rights. Laws are set up to establish
sovereignty, territory and property rights, protect human rights, interpret universal rights and advance the civil rights of vulnerable groups in
society. Rights can become a language of hierarchy. In the international legal system, states are afforded more rights (and responsibilities) than the individuals within a state or non-state actors. Identity
becomes a prerequisite for determining which parties may adjudicate
rights in certain forums (e.g. the International Court of Justice).
Disputes are resolved by interpreting the parties' rights in accordance
with the law leading to questions about the enforceability of international legal judgments. Yet not all rights are universal nor are they
universally applied. Many sources of international law were established
by relatively few nations and serve to protect their interests. Thus, states
who were not involved with the creation of the law or the formation of
the adjudicative forum may avoid adjudication when they disagree with
these pre-established rights. The debates between the UN General
Assembly and the UN Security Council illustrate this tension. When

157. FEN OSLER HAMPSON, NURTURING PEACE: WHY PEACE SETTLEMENTS SUCCEED OR FAIL 53-58

(1996).
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rights are enjoyed by only a few or deemed to be absolute, they can
become non-negotiable and thus a source of conflict.
IDR approaches rights by treating them as components of the
dispute. A conflict arising over interests may be expressed in the
language of rights. By shifting the language back to interests, parties
can reengage in problem-solving behavior based on creating value and
collaborating to achieve common goals. Other aspects of IDR are also
important. For example, increased participation in the process can
provide participants with a sense that their rights are being protected
even absent a formal court proceeding. Bangladeshi women who
participated in community mediation reported that they "believe that
they receive better protection and more compensation ... than from
1 58
the formal court system.'

However, a tension can form between problem-solving and promoting rights and justice. Truth and reconciliation commissions (TRC) are
IDR mechanisms designed for the purpose of promoting forgiveness
and healing among many people after a mass-trauma has occurred; the
primary purpose is not to adjudicate crimes or protect the legal rights
of victims. TRC's have been used in many countries around the world,
most notably in South Africa and Northern Ireland. Alternatively, after
the mass-atrocities in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda, ad-hoc
adjudicative tribunals were set up to hold perpetrators legally accountable for their crimes.1 5 9 The costs and benefits of both approaches
must be closely examined to determine the best method for future use.
Perhaps the existing either-or model can be exchanged for options
designed to achieve the desirable outcomes of both.
Legitimacy

International law lacks centralized authority, but centralized authority is not the only way to achieve legitimacy and accountability.16 ° IDR

158. CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND GOVERNANCE, ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PRAcTrrONERS' GUIDE 14 (1998); Cohen, supra note 71, at 337-40 (exploring the use of "rights-based"
mediation in Nepal); see also C.J. Larkin & Pamela A. DeVoe, Community Mediation in the Shadow of
Revolution: The Nepal Experience, ACREsOLUTION, Summer 2006, at 20 (describing the use of
rights-based community mediation in Nepal); Jean R. Sternlight, Is Alternative DisputeResolution
Consistent with the Rule of Law?Lessonsfrom Abroad, 56 DEPAuL L. REV. 569, 576 n.44 (2007).
159. STEVEN R. RATNER &JASON S. ABRAMS, ACCOUNTABILlY FOR HUMAN RIGHTS ATRoCITIES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW-BEYOND THE NUREMBERG LEGACY 190-91 (2d ed. 2001) (discussing the
establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia); id. at 201-02
(discussing the establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda).
160. See Raustiala, supranote 79, at 430.
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also provides tools that build these elements. Legitimacy is defined as
the perception that an actor (individual or organization) has the right
to intervene in a conflict, make a decision, and enforce an outcome. 16 1
Mediation makes parties want to comply because it promotes creative
problem-solving, legitimacy, cost savings, more complete and durable
solutions, and improved reputations. 162 A powerful and impartial
mediator who has legitimacy and credibility is able to induce compliance. This was the role the UNSC played in putting forth theJune 1967
Middle East ceasefire, which parties complied with because the demand came from the UN.163 IDR also reduces barriers to forming
agreements. For example, mediation overcomes uncertainty by providing structured information exchange, balancing power dynamics and
ensuring a fair process. 164 Even when mediations fail, they still facilitate
fact finding for subsequent processes and can improve understanding
between parties. 16 5 IDR also builds accountability into the process,
creating feedback loops where parties monitor and rely upon each
other. Improved accountability helps to establish credibility, improving
the legitimacy of the parties and the process. These factors improve
coordination between the parties by promoting dialogue, communication, and collaboration.
Reputation
Reputation is a strong behavioral-motivation factor. 1 66 A nation's
concerns about preserving, repairing, or advancing its reputation can
encourage participation in agreement-formation or dispute-resolution
processes and compliance with outcomes. IDR processes can highlight
or protect participants' reputations. Sometimes political pressure is
needed to motivate parties to participate in a negotiation or peace
process. Given the collaborative nature and problem-solving focus of

161. Bercovitch, supra note 85, at 260.
162. See id. at 261-62 (concluding that the success of mediation depends on the confluence
of all of the factors discussed-context, nature of the stakeholders, timing, strategy, mediator
behavior, etc. of all parties and ability to finalize agreements).
163. FISHER ET AL., supra note 62, at 235-36 (discussing the UNSC decision regarding the
Suez Canal).
164. CHRISTIAN BfJHRING-UHLE, ARBITRATION AND MEDIATION IN INTERNATIONAL BusiNEss 336
tbl.3 (2006).
165. Id. at 337-38.
166. See Tom Ginsburg & Richard H. McAdams, Adjudicating in Anarchy: An Expressive Theory
of InternationalDispute Resolution, 45 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1229, 1239 n.23 (2004). See generally
Andrew Guzman, InternationalLaw: A Compliance Based Theory, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823 (2002).
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IDR, parties may be encouraged to participate so they can enjoy the
reputational benefits of being viewed as a team player. A mediator can
invite both parties to participate, taking the blame if the process
dissolves while allowing the parties to receive credit if the process
succeeds. The confidential nature of mediation also encourages participation when reputations are at risk. Ultimately, parties must weigh the
risks and benefits to reputation with those of other factors like interests
or rights. Once involved in the IDR process, that participant may find
other motivations for participating. The opposite can also be the case.
Sometimes states avoid participating when their political reputation
would suffer. A state may want to negotiate with another state, but does
not want to be the one to extend an offer. IDR processes like mediation
and conciliation are used in inter-state political matters because of
their confidential nature and face-saving benefits. This design element
of IDR offers a benefit to states, namely a chance to improve or regain
reputation, which becomes an interest. In low-stakes situations, parties
may comply with outcomes because the reputation benefits outweigh
the costs. Reputational benefits are particularly important in the interstate context for politically sensitive matters involving
questions of
16 7
foreign policy that affect large numbers of people.
Emotions

IDR approaches are based on an understanding that influencing
behavior requires changing not only minds but also emotion. According to Gardner the five primary ways to change minds are 1) reasonchange the way people think; 2) research-present new content that
changes what people think; 3) resonance- change minds because of
relation between mind-changer and change, i.e., you like them, they
like you, credibility, legitimacy, accountability, etc.; 4) resources-new
options become available making the impossible possible; and 5)
changed circumstances- events occur that modify the context. 168 Thus,
thinking that informs behavior can be changed through new information and through emotion.
IDR has the capacity to address such underlying emotional factors
that are present in conflicts. Every dispute has a negative emotional
element. IDR encourages parties to understand what is producing

167. CROCKER ET AL., supra note 18, at 24-25.
168. HowARD GARDNER, CHANGING MINDS: THE
OTHER PEOPLE'S MINDS 15-18 (2006).

ART AND SCIENCE OF CHANGING OUR OWN AND
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negative emotions.' 69 Sources include identity issues, concerns about
reputation, and the need for respect. In IL, emotional concerns are
channeled into intellectual concerns resulting in discussions about
rights or power instead of bruised reputations, for example. IDR not
only recognizes emotional elements, it also provides techniques for
constructively dealing with them as elements of conflict. Mediators
often use reframing as a technique to inform content. Updating
information, whether through reframing, storytelling or other methods is a proven technique for influencing behavior.
In legal systems, behavioral change of individuals is achieved through
deterrence models that apply a fine or penalty if a person takes a
certain course of action. The logic behind this model assumes the
penalty will cause the person to behave differently in the future. When
effective, this system merely prevents a certain type of behavior, but it is
not designed to address the underlying cause. IDR-based systems
transform behavior by addressing the emotional aspects of a conflict.
One good example is when mediation is used in victim and offender
reconciliation programs as an alternative to the criminal legal system. A
woman is driving her car on the freeway when her windshield shatters
and almost causes a massive accident. The two young boys who had shot
BB pellets at her car were arrested and the case was referred to
mediation by the district attorney. During the session, the women
exploded angrily at the boys and they responded with tears and
apologized. They began to realize that their actions almost cost this
women her life. As a part of the mediation settlement agreement the
boys agreed to wash the woman's car once a month because they did
not have the money to purchase a new windshield. She was nervous at
first but after several months, she came to trust them to be reliable and
do a good job. The relationship evolved as they helped her with more
tasks. Eventually, the older boy decided to go to college with her
encouragement and she paid for his tuition.1 70 This story illustrates
how emotion is a key factor of conflict and how IDR-based processes
are designed to transform even the most difficult aspects of fault,
revenge, restitution and remorse into constructive outcorries.

169. See generally ROGER FISHER & DAVID SHAPIRO, BEYOND REASON (2005); see alsoFISHER & URY,

supranote 88, at 30.

170.
(2001).
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2.

Through Tools: Coercion, Persuasion, Acculturation,
Participation, Coordination

Coercion

Coercion is the use of power to change state behavior against its will.
It can be understood as the use of threats (sanctions, removing political
1 71
or diplomatic support, reduction in aid, etc.) to induce compliance.
Realists commonly assume that international conflicts between states
are ultimately settled by coercive measures. 1 72 However, coercion has
its limitations. First, it can fail to achieve long-term results. Once the
coercive measure has been lifted, not only do states frequently resume
the undesirable behavior but the negative sentiments that follow often
lead to retribution. Second, the costs associated with enforcing first
order compliance are expensive and take resources away from dealing
17
with the situation coercion sought to resolve in the first instance.
States use sanctions to pressure a state to change its behavior by "raising
the cost to an adversary of pursuing a course of action" the other side
does not like. 174 Although sanctions have been successful, when they
fail it is often because they create a situation where the coerced state
becomes invested in the adversarial relationship and entrenched in
their opposing course of action, not motivated to change it.175 For

example, one state may respond to another by withholding something
they assume to be of value (e.g., preferential trade treatment, finances,
military support). Entrenchment occurs when the coerced state concludes that if it has already lost most of its privileges it is not going to
give in now to save the few that remain. This demonstrates how the use
of coercion to increase pain is often an ineffective strategy for behavior
change. When incurred costs do not influence change, marginal shifts
in future costs are not likely to produce change. 176 Trying to reverse a
decision through coercion is unlikely to yield results due to natural
inertia, preventing reconsideration of past decisions and producing
1 77
negative implications of perceived reversal of a prior decision.
IDR recognizes the importance and prominence of coercive measures. Coercion and military force were used in conjunction with

171. Bercovitch, supra note 85, at 260.
172. Kriesberg, supra note 61, at 65.
173. FISHER, supra note 63, at 194.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 195-96.

176. Id.
177. Id. at 196-97.
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mediation to secure an end to the active violent conflict in Bosnia
resulting in the 1995 Dayton accords. 17 Yet U.S. and NATO forces are
resources not readably available for most international conflicts. IDR
offers alternatives. Coercion relies on a weaker party that is uninformed
about tactics and options. IDR empowers parties about coercive tactics
so that they can recognize and call other participants on their use of
such tactics, resulting in the reduction of coercion. 179 For example,
clear determination of BATNAs (best alternative to a negotiated agreement) arms parties with power in a negotiation because they help
parties know their walk-away point, which protects them from making a
baddeal.1 80 The use of coalition-building to form allies often strengthens the position of weaker states, as has been the case for the Group of
77 at the United Nations.' 81 It is important to understand the limits of
coercion and to offer other alternatives. In order to change state
behavior over the long-term, states must be influenced in ways that do
not require continuous enforcement because the international system
is not set up to effectively force a state to behave a certain way
indefinitely.
Persuasion
Persuasion is technique for changing behavior that involves influencing through information, incentives, norms, and other factors. IDR
encourages the use of persuasion through mutual-gains negotiation
theory as well as by encouraging information sharing, which leads to
coordination. Mediators and conciliators use persuasion to motivate
disputants to seek common ground through their ability to portray an
alternative future that is more favorable than continuing the conflict.' 8 2 Promoting full information exchange and good relations are

178. CROCKER ET AL., TAMING INTRACrABLE CoNFLicrs, supra note 151, at 169.
179. See Andrew Guzman, InternationalLaw: A Compliance Based Theoy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823
(2002) (describing participation in dispute resolution procedures as an alternative to sanctions
for enforcing IL rules and commitments).
180. FISHER & URY, supra note 88, at 97.
181. The Group of 77 is a loose coalition of developing nations to further economic interests.
It was founded in 1964 byjoint declaration at the first session of the UN Conference on Trade and
Development. Group of 77 at the United Nations, About the Group of 77, http://www.g77.org/
doc.

182. CROCKER ET AL., TURBULENT PEACE, supra note 18, at 437 (noting the use of persuasion by
then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and President Jimmy Carter as they mediated between
Egypt, Syria and Israel in 1978).
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criteria of effective problem-solving. 183 Mediators may persuade parties
to engage in IDR by using elicitive techniques that gain trust and allow
the mediator to reframe options.1 8 4 Yet mediators must take caution
not to let persuasion turn into coercion because it could threaten the
mediator's neutrality and derail the process. Persuasion is a tool that
can lead to coordination, collaboration and problem-solving. 185 Persuasion may be viewed as a secondary alternative to coercion when the use
of force is not an option, yet sometimes it is the most preferable tool.
The example of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement is a good example.1 86
Using coercive measures to pressure paramilitary groups in Northern
Ireland to decommission had not proven successful. 187 Instead, these
groups were persuaded to participate in an IDR process that would
create a power-sharing framework, elections and joint governance.
Creating such a process allowed the various stakeholders to assess and
pursue their own interests in coordination with the other parties. Thus,
persuasion was the primary tool for influencing behavior change in this
example.
Acculturation

Acculturation is the exchange of cultures that takes place when
groups interact. 1 88 As a tool of influence, acculturation works by
encouraging assimilation with the dominant culture. For example,
when delegates to the UN adopt "dip talk," they are assimilating into
the dominant diplomatic culture despite the differing national identities, ethnicities and languages.' 8 9 Acculturation is cited as being particularly helpful in international human rights organizations. These inter-

183. SeePruitt, supra note 21, at 43-44 (noting the criteria of effective problem-solving: firm
flexibility, good relations between the parties, full information and reframing).
184. CROCKER ET AL., TAMING INTRACTABLE CoNFuCrs, supra note 151, at 14.
185. Scholars have observed that emerging new forms of governance require greater skills in
negotiation and collaboration. See, e.g., AGRANOFF & McGunIE, supranote 80; Bingham et al., supra
note 80; THE TooLs OF GOVERNMENT, supra note 80.
186. CROCKER ET AL., TAMING INTRAcrABLE CoNmrS, supra note 151, at 174-75.

187. Id."
188. See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International
HumanRights Law, 54 DuKE L.J. 621,638 (2004).
189. Ryan Goodman & DerekJinks, Toward an InstitutionalTheory of Sovereignty, 55 STAN. L.
REV. 1749 (2003) (discussing how acculturation is particularly effective when states belong to a
social club by participating in a particular international regime and demonstrating how acculturation is used as a socialization process to influence states to adopt international norms, particularly
in the human rights context although it can be distinguished from persuasion because although
acculturation can occur through the use of persuasive tactics, like shaming and back patting, this
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national processes help to acculturate parties to consider international
law when making decisions. Although IL scholarship debates the merits
of acculturation, it is generally recognized as a tool for influencing state
behavior.
Acculturation takes place during a mediation or negotiation when
parties become highly motivated to reach an agreement due to IDR's
cultural focus on interest-based collaboration and problem-solving.
The principal-agent'9 ° problem illustrates how parties involved in a
process have different perceptions (different interests and incentives)
of the terms of an agreement than decision-makers who are not
present. Many diplomats have experienced this when, after achieving a
seeming breakthrough in negotiation, they place a call to headquarters
only to be told "no deal." Participants in the decision-making process
become acculturated in a way that non-participants do not.
A good example of how an IDR process enhanced acculturation is
the case of the United Nations Compensation Commission (UNCC).
The UNCC was formed by the UN Security Council in 1991 to process
claims and provide compensation to parties injured by Iraq's invasion
into Kuwait. 191 This quasi-judicial body was the first of its kind within
the UN. In the context of the UNCC multilateral negotiation, mediation and facilitation all take place among the UNCC Secretariat,
Governing Council, representatives of claimants' countries and international organizations, and representatives from Iraq. These four categories of stakeholders used IDR processes to engage in decision-making
and problem-solving during the course of the UNCC's operation.
Together and through this process the UNCC successfully resolved
over 2 million claims and awarded over $52 billion in compensation
within just fifteen years. The efficiency of this body was paralleled by its
effectiveness in achieving its purpose. The UNCC has currently disbanded its secretariat, a rare example of a UN organ that is shutting

use takes place within a larger social context). But see Alkoby, supra note 159, at 173-74 (arguing
that acculturation relies on the misassumption of one dominant culture).
190. See Robert H. Mnookin, Why NegotiationsFail:An Explorationof Barriersto the Resolution of
Conflict, 8 OHIO ST.J. ON Disp. RESOL. 235, 238-39 (1993) (defining the principal-agent problem
and discussing how it can be a barrier to reaching agreement).
191. The UNSC adopted resolution under Chapter VII of the UN Charter,.S.C. Res. 687,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/687 (Apr. 3, 1991), finding liability of Iraq and delegating adjudication/factfinding to a newly created sub-body, the UNCC. UN Security Council decisions are binding on
Member States. U.N. Charter art. 25. UNSC decided that Iraq was liable. leaving quasi-judicial
functions to the UNCC Secretariat vs. Governing Body who implemented a hybrid IDR process
paving the way for state collaboration on the implementation of environmental remediation in
the Gulf through the F4 environmental awards.
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down operations because itsjob has been completed.
Of all the claimants that came before the UNCC, the F4 category was
reserved for countries that sought compensation specifically for environmental and ecological damage caused by Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. The
UNCC awarded these claimants over $1.1 billion in compensation.
These claimants include certain Gulf states that do not enjoy stable and
strong political relationships with each other. In this instance, these
nations decided to pool compensation and work together to address
the problem of environmental remediation in the Gulf. In my observation, this surprising alliance was due in large part to the recognition
that the environmental problems-water pollution, species decline
and land pollution, to name a few-went beyond one state's borders
and required multilateral cooperation to successfully remediate the
damage. These informed stakeholders who shared a common goal
were motivated to work collaboratively to solve the problem. The
UNCC Secretariat served as a neutral convener and was able to coordinate the parties' interests, manage expectations and facilitate a process
to develop a regional environmental remediation program. Despite the
larger political differences, these countries used IDR to solve a collective problem (environmental remediation in the Gulf) and form
agreements that they are now implementing. This took place within the
UNCC-a culture that supported and promoted IDR thinking.
Participation

IDR processes maximize participation. Whether the process is to
make a decision, resolve a conflict, or reach an agreement, IDR
processes are designed to be as inclusive of all the stakeholders as
possible. The benefit of maximizing participation by stakeholders is not
always found in reaching an outcome, but in achieving compliance
with the outcome. The more participants involved in the process, the
more complicated it can become. The IDR perspective advocates
having key stakeholders participate at appropriate stages of the process
and offers ways to keep others informed and included. Participation
breeds a sense of ownership of the process1 92 and allows for the
internalization of norms. The logistics of who convenes the process, as
well as how and when the process commences, affect participation
levels and satisfaction rates. Stakeholder participation at the early
stages of the process is highly recommended. Ability to participate is

192. Susan Carpenter, Choosing Appropriate Consensus Building Techniques and Strategies, in
CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK,

supra note 103, at 61, 62.
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determined by those affected by the process. Maximizing participation
in the process increases the likelihood of achieving compliance over
the long term. For example, if parties find that they cannot comply due
to resource constraints, they can better facilitate renegotiations if they
were participants in the first round. Risks that non-participants will
form coalitions to block a process from being implemented are also
minimized.
Participation was an important aspect of the formation of the 1999
Treaty for the Establishment of the East African Community. The lead
mediator, Umbricht, designed a participatory law-making process where
a draft of the treaty was widely disseminated among East Africans with
the goal of eliciting their comments. 19 3 In this way, the principles of
high participation found in IDR developed out of a mediation effort
and spread into the public policy realm. By informing the governed
about the law and eliciting their participation in determining the
outcome, the process helped shape participants' interests and ultimately led to the successful adoption of the treaty.
Mediators with high status often induce elevated levels of participation because of the propensity for parties to yield to suggestions from a
powerful or highly-esteemed source.1 9 4 This was the case when former
President Jimmy Carter met with North Korea in 1994 and relayed a
message to President Clinton about North Korea's willingness to negotiate, thus preventing escalation.19 5
Coordination

Coordination, a concept common in game theory, functions by
organizing information. The classic Prisoner's Dilemma game illustrates how parties can achieve maximum outcomes through coordination that they may not achieve operating in isolation. 196 Coordination
theory explores the challenges that states or other actors may face when
they have common interests but fail to reach an agreed or optimal

193. KHOTI KAMAGA, SOME CoNsrruT-IoNAL DIMENSIONS OF EAST AFRICAN COOPERATION, http://
www.kituochakatiba.co.ug/Constm %202001%20%2OKhoti%20EAC.pdf.
194. Pruitt, supra note 21, at 51.
195. Id. (citing R. Jeffrey Smith and Ann Devroy, Carter's Callfrom North Korea Looms Large,
WASH. Posr, June 26, 1994, at Al).
196. See Kriesberg, supra note 61, at 85 (describing the Prisoner's Dilemma as a model where
two suspected criminals cannot communicate with each other but have to choose one of the
following options: confess or remain silent. If both. confess, they go to prison. If both remain
silent, they go free. If one confesses, the other serves time. This demonstrates the classic
coordination problem often discussed in game theory).
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outcome. 19 7 Coordination considers the complexities that nations face
in organizing aligned and conflicting interests.
IDR processes are designed to serve as coordination mechanisms.
Negotiation, arbitration, mediation, and conciliation can all be used to
facilitate the exchange of information among the maximum number of
stakeholders, creating environments that foster increased access to and
sharing of information. These processes also help parties cooperate
with each other to select one plan when multiple options are available.
Coordination helps when states need to pick the same option to
achieve the optimal outcome. Through negotiation, parties are able to
reach agreement in principle and on the specific steps needed to
implement outcomes. According to Bercovitch, full-information exchange is one of the essential elements for effective problem-solving
behavior in international mediation. 198 A common demonstration is
the orange dilemma. An orange is divided in equal halves and given to
two parties. Both parties assert the position that they want the entire
orange, so neither party is happy with the initial outcome of equal
division. Using a mutual gains model of negotiation, the parties exchange information about their underlying interests. One side wants to
make orangejuice and the other wants to make orange meringue. One
needs the entire orange and the other needs the entire peel. A trade is
arranged and both parties achieve optimal outcomes. In this way, IDR
provides processes that help coordinate information and interests
among parties, leading to voluntary compliance.
Coordination occurs by clarifying ambiguities and providing signals.
A study by Ginsburg and McAdams suggests that states comply with
international rules that cannot be enforced through sanctions when
international courts rule on state obligations to comply (and when the
situation involves a coordination context) because courts clarify ambiguities and courts provide signals that cause parties to update beliefs
about facts that both affect decision-making and influence behavior. 199
In addition to judges, mediators, conciliators, and other third-party
neutrals also provide these functions. 200 Coordination works in conflict
settings to motivate parties to settle disputes when parties recognize
that they need to work together to overcome costs or avert future risks.
For example, the PLO and Israel recognized the threat of a common

197. Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 167, at 1243 n.35.
198. Pruitt, supra note 21, at 43-44. See generallyRIcHARD E. WALTON & ROBERT B. McKERSIE, A
BEHAVIORAL THEORY OF LABOR NEGOTIATIONS (1965).
199. Ginsburg & McAdams, supra note 167, at 1229.
200. See BLUM,supra note 74, at 62.
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enemy-Hamas-and were motivated to support each other after the
1992 election of Rabin as the Israeli prime minister. 20 ' Both groups
relied on the other for political power to counter Hamas.
B.

DR's Unique Influence on State Behavior

The analysis above demonstrates how IDR advances the criteria
affecting state behavior. This section presents two reasons why IDR
influences state behavior. First, the nature in which states engage in
IDR makes them more willing to absorb its normative influences.
Second, IDR's assumptions offer a more accurate platform for the
analysis of state behavior.
1. IDR Fosters Permeability and Therefore Absorption
People-distinguish between how decisions are made and the substance of those decisions. 20 2 States are more likely to participate in a
process or comply with an arrangement if they elect to do so. IDR
represents a category of tools that are used voluntarily. When states
elect to use a form of IDR, they understand its voluntary nature and are
thus more open to the process. Open engagement creates an environment of high permeability, which fosters absorption. Stated differently,
because of IDR's voluntary nature and flexible design, participants are
more open to the experience and thus are more susceptible to its
influence. Openness allows the norms of IDR. to influence what states
value and what their interests are. The culture of IDR is malleable-it
can adjust to the parties and the parties can adjust to it. This back and
forth dynamic creates the permeable membrane between process and
actors that fosters the absorption of influence. When state engagement
in IDR occurs in a climate of problem solving, collaboration, and
flexibility this helps participants engage with openness. This creates
permeability, allowing for the ways that IDR influences norms, factors
and tools to be absorbed. The logic is that the more open states are to
the possibility of problem-solving when they come to the negotiation
table or use mediation, the more influence the process will have on
them.

201. Pruitt, supra note 21, at 49.
202. TYLER, supra note 20, at 5.
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2.

IDR Processes Correct for Common (Mis)Assumptions in
International Law

IDR processes of negotiation, conciliation, mediation, and arbitration are methods parties use to make decisions, form agreements, and
resolve disputes. While all of these processes differ from one another,
they share a set of common assumptions and core principles that both
relate to and diverge from those in international law. Many scholars
subscribe to the following assumptions about actors in the international legal system: a few powerful states created the existing set of
international laws, states are good at assessing self-interests, and states
can accurately anticipate the actions of others. 20 3 IDR methods are not
based on these assumptions and, in fact, characterize many of them as
imperfect. Instead, IDR makes the following assumptions.
First, actors' perceptions of reality often do not accurately reflect
reality because truth and reality are subjective. The concept of inatten20 4
tional blindness discussed in Part I helps to support this argument.
Another illustration is a common perception game used in negotiation
training that asks participants to look at an image and count the
number of squares they see. Answers among participants vary widely
from a small to a large number of squares. There is one correct answer
to the puzzle, but the majority of participants fail to arrive at an
accurate count. Tools like this perception game are used to teach
actors that their perception of reality varies widely from others' perceptions of reality and their perception of an objective situation can be,
and often is inaccurate. This illustrates a core principle in IDR theoryassumptions can be mistaken and misleading, so actors must rely on
information-gathering techniques to assemble precise information.
IDR techniques like stakeholder assessment, conflict mapping and the
"single text" approach used during the assessment phase of a process
facilitate objective information gathering. This design enhances coordination within and among the parties through information sharing and
signaling, illustrating how IDR affects an element of behavioral motivation.
Second, actors are not always good at assessing their own interests. It
is not enough to assume that states are acting in their best rational

203. Robert Keohane, Comment, InternationalRelations and InternationalLaw: Two Optics, 38

HARv. INT'L L.J. 487, 493 (1997) (discussing common assumptions that a) states are good at
assessing self-interests and anticipating the actions of others; b) a few powerful states made the
rules and want to enforce them; and c) coordination and assurance situations are common).
204. See Simons & Chabris, supranote 90, at 1059-74.
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interests because actors within states often have imperfect information,
motives or expectations. For example, Burma's decision not to allow
foreign aid for cyclone victims is arguably in its best interest. Burma's
government has been controlled by the military since 1962.205 Leaders
have a strong interest in maintaining absolute authority over the state
and portraying an image of ultimate control to the public. Allowing aid
workers could risk public scrutiny of the regime, highlighting its
inability to accurately assess the damage, count the deceased, and
arrange for the logistics necessary to administer aid. Publicity of these
facts could spark insurgency and public outcry, running the risk of civil
instability. From the government's perspective, the cost of these threats
could outweigh the benefit of accepting help with the humanitarian
crisis. Framed from a rationalist viewpoint, Burma's decision to close its
borders could arguably be said to represent the state's best rational
self-interest.
Approaching the crisis in Burma from an IDR perspective would
begin with assessing the situation. Assessment is necessary to uncover
the government's interests and concerns. There is no assumption that
Burma will operate in its rational best interest. By reframing the
information to decision-makers, IDR can help make Burmese officials
aware of their choices and the costs (including externalities) and
benefits that follow. This information can empower informed and
more productive decision-making, providing opportunities for maximizing optimal outcomes and enhancing problem-solving. For example,
educating parties to consider their BATNA and their reservation point
(the point at which it is better to walk away from the deal than agree)
compels actors to analyze how to utilize their available assets to reach
notjust an agreement, but an optimal agreement. 20 6 These techniques
highlight the importance IDR places on self-assessment and foster
conditions that maximize gains and promote voluntary compliance.
Third, actors are often ill-equipped to accurately evaluate other
actors' interests, particularly when identity issues are involved. IDR
emphasizes the need for actors to view a situation from multiple
perspectives in order to reach an optimal outcome. This can be
achieved through both empathy-seeing the other in oneself-and
perspective-taking-understanding the other person's point of view. A
recent study suggests that perspective-taking is the better approach for

205. See Central Intelligence Agency, CIA World Factbook-Burma, https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html#Govt (last visited Mar. 19, 2009).
206. FISHER & URY, supra note 88, at 97-103.
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negotiation where the use of empathy may be preferable in a mediation
setting, particularly when dealing with identity issues.2 °7 IDR processes
build in mechanisms that promote multiple perspective-viewing through
the use of assessment tools like stakeholder assessments and conflict
maps. A stakeholder assessment uses a neutral and authorized convener to survey stakeholders in an effort that results in a comprehensive
understanding of all the stakeholders' interests. 208 When an identity
issue is at play, the ability to see other parties' perspectives often
becomes occluded, as described by the inattentional blindness concept
previously mentioned. Hard bargaining tactics are frequently used to
obscure an actor's true interests, resulting in reduced communication
between stakeholders. Facilitation and mediation are designed to reopen
the channels of communication when direct communication fails.
C.

]DR's Effect on State Compliance

Assessing how IDR influences factors and tools that influence state
behavior and understanding why IDR has the ability to influence states
in distinctive ways offer important insights for the larger field of
international legal process theory. The final aim of this Article is to
analyze whether IDR can, in fact, advance these criteria in ways that
foster greater state compliance with international law. Demonstrating
this claim relies on two things.
First, the descriptive analysis above illustrates how IDR can encourage factors, like legitimacy, that have been linked to increased rates of
compliance. As discussed in the Introduction, Tyler's work provides
strong evidence as to why compliance requires establishing and maintaining conditions that lead the public to accept decisions, albeit in the
domestic setting. 20 9 This insight is critical because it suggests that states
may be able to design international legal processes in ways that will
induce compliance.
Second, although limited, empirical studies do suggest a link between IDR and increased rates of compliance with outcomes. Proving
this claim requires further research and analysis, but it is important to
consider the possibilities that such a claim raises. While the following
examples are not direct evidence of the link between IDR and increased compliance, they do connect IDR processes with factors and
tools that impact, compliance. A 2005 study on international commer-

207. Editorial, Angry China,THE ECONOMIST, May 3, 2008, at 58.
208. See generally SUSSKIND ET AL., supranote 103.

209.

TYLER,

supra note 20, at 19.
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cial arbitration cases reported a 74% rate of voluntary compliance with
the outcomes. 210 This study demonstrates an example where the majority of participants, albeit not states, voluntarily complied with the
outcome of the arbitration, even absent a formal enforcement. Studies
of ADR use in the United States support the same premise. Susskind
reported high rates of compliance with agreements formed using his
consensus-building facilitation approach, including a San Francisco
regional transit planning effort where a case study documented how
processes using the consensus-building criteria were most effective in
producing benefits. 2 11 A housing mediation case reported that an
agreement to create approximately 5000 affordable housing opportunities was intact and complied with by the majority of participants ten
years later.21 2 A 2003 empirical study on U.S. court mediation programs found that higher participation rates led to higher rates of
settlement agreements and satisfaction.2 13 Another survey-based study
on court mediation documented that on average, settlement and
satisfaction rates were around 70%.214 The study also found that

210. Naimark & Keer, supra note 135, at 95-98, presents results from a 2005 survey showing
that in 118 international commercial cases (where claimant/filing parties won 100 cases and lost
18) 74 of the 100 awards were complied with in full, 4 achieved partial compliance, and 22
re-negotiated the post award to establish final settlement terms. These results, albeit for commercial arbitration cases, suggest a 74% rate of full-compliance absent formal enforcement mechanisms. The authors suggest that one significant reason for such compliance was the parties' need
for finality-either to conserve costs or preserve reputations. In the limited cases of noncompliance, the reasons cited were bankruptcy, disappearance of losing party, non-response, and lack of
court enforcement. The lack of a formal enforcement mechanism was one of many reasons cited
for noncompliance and was not significant.
211. See generally SUSSKiND ET AL., supra note 103 (presenting research that suggests that
processes meeting the criteria laid out in the CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK are most effective in

producing benefits).
212. Id. at 798-99.
213. Bobbi McAdoo et al., Institutionalization: What Do Empirical Studies Tell Us about Court
Mediation?,Disp. RESOL. MAG., Winter 2003, at 8, 8-10, concludes that higher participation in the
mediation increases likeliness of reaching settlement, cooperative behavior among the lawyers and
perceptions of fairness. Mandatory requirements that lawyers consider ADR as a part of their litigation
plans gave lawyers more control over the logistics of the mediation, increased the use of mediation,
and faced less opposition than court ordered mediation. Cases most likely to settle were those where
the-litigants' positions were closer together, issues less complex and/or liability less strongly contested;
mediator experience was the most significant factor to achieving settlement over training or subject
matter expertise. Of all mediation styles used, active facilitation and evaluative intervention (i.e. when
mediators disclose their views about the merits of the case but not extreme like recommending a
settlement) produced more settlements and heightened perceptions of proceduraljustice.
214. Jennifer Shack, Efficiency: Mediation in Courts Can BringGains, but Under What Conditions?,
Disp. RESOL. MAC., Winter 2003, at 11, 11-14, discusses why and when mediation achieved
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women were more likely to be satisfied with mediated results over
adjudicated ones-with no difference for men's satisfaction between
the two processes, and Hispanics were more likely to be satisfied with
mediation while whites were equally satisfied with either process.2 15
Consequently, there is no direct empirical support that IDR induces
state compliance. Yet state use of IDR processes are increasing, especially mediation, and the use includes hard cases involving high stakes
political matters and violent conflicts. State participation in and compliance with IDR is voluntary, so, as Franck put the question, "why do
powerful states obey powerless rules? ' 2 16 The rise in IDR use suggests
that states are seeking out IDR to create powerless rules, agreements,
and decisions. Perhaps the reasons they do so is because power is not
the only way to advance their needs. IDR offers states flexibility, discretion,
confidentiality, face-saving benefits if efforts fail, and expediency, which is
often required in crisis situations.2 17 States may also be turning to IDR
because it is effective. Defining effective is difficult and subjective.
In IL, state compliance is defined as "a state of conformity or identity
between an actor's behavior and a specified rule." 2 18 This definition
highlights the distinction between compliance and the related concept
of obedience, "defined as behavior resulting from the internalization
of norms." 2 19 While a state may obey a person, rule, norm, or principle
under this definition, states can comply only with a rule or obligation
that is necessarily specific and pre-existing before the act. IL scholars

settlement and was perceived fair; dependent variables included whether parties participated in
the mediation, whether settlement was achieved, demographic of litigants, perception about costs
and willingness to try.
215. Id. at 13 n.4; see Gary LaFree & Christine Rack, The Effects of Participants'Ethnicityand
Gender on Monetary Outcomes in Mediated and Adjudicated Civil Cases, 30 LAw & Soc'y REV. 767,
788-94 (1996) (suggesting that self-perceptions of satisfaction by identity group may not reflect
objective studies suggesting that women and minorities may fare less well in court mediation
programs); see also Cohen, supranote 71, at 307.
216. FRANCK, supra note 19, at3.
217. See Judith E. Innes, Evaluating Consensus Building, in CONSENSUS BUILDING HANDBOOK,
supranote 103, at 631,637-41 (discussing the challenge of evaluating consensus building because
typical notions about success and failure do not apply); Bercovitch, supra note 85, at 262 (citing
B.H. Sheppard, Third Party Conflict Intervention: A Procedural Framework, 6 RES. IN ORGANIZED
BEHAVIOR, 141-90 (1984) (listing twenty-one criteria for assessing intervention outcomes)).
218. See Raustiala & Slaughter, supra note 9, at 539 (citing ROGER FISHER, IMPROVING
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAw 20 (1981) and RONALD B. MITCHELL, INTENTIONAL OIL
POLLUTION AT SEA: ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY AND TREATY COMPLIANCE 30 (1994).

219. Id. (citing Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey the Law, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997);
FRIEDRICH V. KRAcTOCIWIL, RULES, NoRms AND DECISIONS; THE CONDITION OF PRACTICAL AND LEGAL

REASONING IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DOMESTIC AFFAIRS (1989)).
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offer further distinctions between compliance with legal versus nonlegal rules, which has been discussed elsewhere. 220 Instrumental perspectives of compliance rely on understanding how actors shape their
behavior in relation to the law,2 2 ' while deterrence perspectives consider perceptions about the costs and benefits associated with following
or breaking the law. 222 Normative perspectives examine compliance
through the lens of how actors shape their behavior as a function of
morality and personal beliefs about legitimacy.2 23 While offering detailed insight about concepts of compliance, these definitions primarily
treat compliance as it relates to outcomes but not process.
IDR notions of success, compliance and enforcement are necessarily
different. In IDR, success may be best measured by effectivenessachieving the desired goal(s) or improving the problem.2 2 4 As states
continue to use IDR more often, further research considering whether
IDR does induce compliance is needed. Short of that, this analysis has
illustrated how IDR can affect elements 225 that do induce compliance

such as legitimacy, coordination, and participation.2 2 6 As for any
process, in order for IDR to be effective it must be used optimally by the
right parties at the right time. The key is the process. Consensus
building "needs to produce good solutions through good processes.
When process criteria are met, stakeholders who have not achieved
their goals may still support an agreement because they feel their voices
were heard and their interests were incorporated as much as possible. 2 2 7 The power and influence behind IDR methods is located in
the process and in the people that participate, not in a positive source
of authority. IDR research shows that agreements by informed consensus are preferable to ones merely reflecting the "preferences of the
powerful."

228

220. See id. at 544 (discussing how Harold Hongju Koh, TransnationalLegal Process, 75 NEB. L.
REV. 181, 205 (1996) taps into a widespread belief about the qualitative difference between
compliance with legal vs. non-legal rules).
221. TYLER, supranote 20, at3.
222. Id.

223. Id. at 3-4.
224. See Raustiala & Slaughter, supra note 9, at 539.
225. Bercovitch, supra note 85, at 260 (providing Rubin's six bases of resources for influencing behavior: reward, coercion, expertise, legitimacy, reference, and information).
226. FISHER ET AL., supranote 63, at 226 (arguing why credibility rests on compliance).
227. Innes, supranote 218, at 641.
228. See Raustiala, supranote 79, at 423.
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V.

CHALLENGES AND CRITIQUES

A.

Selection Problem

A serious critique of IDR is that it works because states only choose to
use it for easy problems. 229Another version of the selection problem is
that states only make agreements that do not require much enforcement.23 0 A selection problem suggests that high rates of compliance
can be explained because the types of disputes or decisions to which
IDR processes are applied are most ripe for resolution. States seek out
IDR processes to solve easy problems, thus accounting for successful
outcomes defined by party satisfaction and compliance. This would
suggest that states would not select IDR to deal with hard problems
such as war crimes, nuclear nonproliferation, regime change, or genocide. A selection problem suggests that states self-select out of options
that require in-depth cooperation and enforcement to succeed because IDR does not offer enforcement safeguards.
Notwithstanding these important considerations, it is also evident
that while parties use IDR to form agreements that do not require
enforcement, they also use IDR to form agreements that do. As the
North Korea example demonstrates, sometimes states do seek IDR to
deal with hard problems. A possible reason is because traditional
options have failed to produce results and maintaining the status quo is
not a viable alternative.
In the United States, empirical studies suggest that people who
engaged in court-mandated mediation enjoyed the same rates of
settlement as those who engaged voluntarily. - 31 This suggests that the
success of the mediation process in this study was not significantly
dependent on user selection. Even if selection bias is present-either
because IDR attracts issues that are easily resolved or parties that are
highly motivated to reach a solution-it fails to overcome the benefit of
studying the relationship between IDR process and state behavior.2 3 2

229. Andrew T. Guzman, The Cost of Credibility: Explaining Resistance to Interstate Dispute
Resolution Mechanisms, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 303-26 (2002) (arguing that dispute resolution clauses
more likely in low stakes, multilateral agreements because out of 100 international agreements
only 20 had mandatory dispute resolution clauses).
230. See Chayes & Chayes, supra note 16, at 184 (discussing selection problem defined as
states only making agreements that don't require much enforcement).
231. McAdoo, supra note 214, at 8-10.
232. Ginsburg & McAdams, supranote 167, at 1239 n.22.
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B.

Challengesof InterdisciplinaryStudy

The second critique is an analytical one. Wilson states that " [i] nternational law provides a normative framework, an essential ingredient for
the successful operation of any large and complex social arrangement." 233 However, frameworks-a skeleton upon which all norms,
general principles and practices are supported by-are inconsistent in
international law, IDR, and international relations. This diversity in
theoretical structure makes it difficult to compare across disciplines.23 4
The cultural clash between fields can also result in the watering down
of standards, criteria, and norms unique to each field.2 35 However
important, these scholarly distinctions fade quickly when policy-makers
and diplomats are faced with addressing an international crisis. The
rise of IDR across many sectors suggests that it may be helpful to
different actors for some of the same reasons. IL, IR, IDR, and other
disciplines all attempt to address the same international problems and
global crises. For these reasons, the costs of using a comparative
framework must be balanced against the benefits of achieving interdisciplinary dialogue within fields that share common goals.
C.

Limits oflDR

This Article has largely focused on the benefits of IDR in theory.
However, despite best intentions and design, IDR processes do not
always work. One example is the Munich Pact of 1938.236 After two
rounds of negotiation and mediation, the parties were unable to reach
a lasting peace settlement to prevent World War II for the following key

233. See FOUNDATIONS, supra note 10, at 22 (quoting from Peter Wilson, The English School

and the Sociology of International Law: Strengths and Limitations, (December 2003) (unpublished manuscript on file at the University of Leeds), available at http://www.polis.leeds.ac.uk/

assets/files/research/english-school/english-school-conference-papers.pdf).
234. Raustiala & Slaughter, supranote 9, at 545.
235. Jay Rothman, Identity and Conflict: Collaboratively AddressingPolicy-Community Conflict in
Cincinnati, Ohio, 22 OHIO ST.J. ON DIsp. RESOL. 105, 128 (2006).
236. See generally Lionel D. Warshauer, Note, The Munich Pact of 1938: ADR Strategiesfor Our
Time? 5 CARDOZOJ. CONFLICT REsOL. 247 (2004). Other examples of failed IDR attempts include

the UNSC's mediation of the Kashmir Dispute, where early mediation efforts failed to develop a
permanent resolution. See Sumathi Subbiah, Note, Security Council Mediation and the Kashmir
Dispute; Reflections on Its Failures and Possibilitiesfor Renewal, 27 B.C. INT'L & COMI. L. REv. 173

(2004) (suggesting that the UNSC's failure to pay attention to the legal dimensions of the dispute
ultimately caused the process to fail). Subbiah suggests that by avoiding the issue of whether
accession was legal, the UNSC forewent an opportunity to use legal pressure to specify and enforce
legal obligations.
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reasons. 23 7 British Prime Minister Chamberlain had a negotiation
strategy based on building trust with Adolf Hitler, which failed. Key
stakeholders (notably representatives from Czechoslovakia and the
Soviet Union) were not involved in the process. Chamberlain conceded early to Hitler's demands regarding secession of parts of Czechoslovakia into Germany. Chamberlain's soft tactics failed to achieve
cooperation when met with Hitler's hard tactics.2 3 8 Mussolini stepped
in as the mediator, but was neither neutral nor fair. Chamberlain
lacked a BATNA, and thus appeared desperate and yielded to pressure,
not principles.2 39 There was an overall lack of good faith.2 4 0 Britain and
France used the process to pressure Czechoslovakia into giving up land
in order to prevent war-an outcome that was adverse to Britain and
France's own interests. Finally, not all of the parties participated in
good faith and Hitler, in particular, did not share an appreciation for
IDR as demonstrated by his later statement that "[t] he enemy did not
expect my great determination. Our enemies are little worms, I saw
them at Munich .... Now Poland is in the position I wanted .... I am
only afraid that some bastard will present me with a mediation plan at
the last moment." 241
This example raises the importance of understanding that IDR
provides tools for preventing, managing, and resolving conflicts. These
tools can be used well or used poorly. To avoid disastrous IDR outcomes it is vital to understand when IDR is most likely to work and why.
This Article has focused on describing how IDR is used in the international context and how functional elements impact state behavior.
Other IDR scholars have considered elements of IDR that contribute to
success or failure, albeit largely outside the framework of international
law and international relations. Some notable empirical findings suggest the following. The success of IDR depends on the stage of the
conflict, implementation, disputant readiness, mediator behavior, ripeness, motivation to settle, resources and a host of other factors.2 42
Bercovitch discusses the great importance of elastic interests, correct
timing, identity of the mediator, and sufficiency of resources on

237. See generally Warshauer, supra note 241; ALLAN BULLOCK, HITLER AND STALIN: PARALLEL
LIvEs (1992); A.J.P. TAYLOR, THE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR 1933-1939, 236 (1963).

238. Id. at 270-276.
239. Warshauer, supranote 237, at 272-74.
240. Id. at 275.

241. Adolf Hitler, Address to German Generals (Aug. 22, 1939) (in German), available at
http://www.ns-archiv.de/krieg/1939/22-08-1939.php.
242. Pruitt, supranote 21, at 41-52.
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successful mediation outcomes.2 4 3 Zartman and Touval suggest that
international mediation is most effective when parties are maximally
motivated to settle, e.g. when they are fed up with the conflict but are
unable reach resolution on their own. 2 4 4 Bercovitch's empirical research suggests that the best time to initiate mediation is half-way
through the life cycle of the conflict after the parties' own efforts have
failed. 245 Touval argues that the combined use of threats (removing
support) and promises (providing support) is more successful than
promises alone.24 6 Pruitt suggests that successful mediators require
muscle, based on a study of domestic mediation showing that when
to arbitrate, disputants become more
mediators have the authority
24 7
motivated to resolve

conflict.

Although this literature provides a basis from which to draw prescriptive conclusions, more interdisciplinary analysis is needed. The cautious lesson is that the mere use of IDR does not ensure just or desirable
outcomes. Skeptics of the benefits of IDR in interstate conflicts, particularly seemingly intractable ones, often point to failed attempts, lack of
compelling national interest as weighed against the costs and risk of
becoming involved, and a sense that vested conflicts do not pose a
regional or global threat, only a national one. These have become
justification for non-intervention in places like Darfur, the Korean
Peninsula, and Zimbabwe. 248 In the face of the many risks and concerns, it is easy to forget the success stories where IDR has brought
about an end to violence and, in some cases, long-lasting peace. Cyprus,
Northern Ireland, Angola, Namibia, El Salvador, and Cambodia provide solid examples. Although peacemaking is costly, conflict ultimately costs more. Only when states internalize the total costs of
protracted conflicts-death, disease, loss of infrastructure, environmental damage, military expenditure, reconstruction-will an accurate
perspective on the total cost of war emerge.

243. Id. at 50 (citing INTERNATIONAL MEDIATION IN THEORYAND PRACTICE, supra note 63).
244. Bercovitch, supra note 85, at 260-62.
245. Bercovitch, supranote 7, at 19 (citingJacob Bercovitch, InternationalMediation:A Study of
the Incidence and Strategiesof Successful Outcomes, 21 Coop. AND CONT. 155-68 (1986)).
246. Pruitt, supra note 21, at 49 (citing Saadia Touval, National Research Council, Mediators'
Leverage (1997) (unpublished)).
247. Dean G. Pruitt, Process and Outcome in Community Mediation, 11 NEGOTIATION J. 365, 367
(1995) (finding that in the U.S. domestic context, disputants are more likely to engage in
problem-solving activity when they are working with a mediator empowered to arbitrate).
248. Id. at 4-5.
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VI.

CONCLUSION

This Article has presented the importance of international legal
process theory in state behavior analysis. It has also introduced IDR as a
form of international legal process that deserves attention. In describing how IDR affects criteria that influence states, the analysis has shown
its distinctive advantages. It has demonstrated why IDR advances state
compliance with international law by understanding that compliance is
a function of the process. Recognizing how process can serve as a tool
of influence, 249 international law and negotiations scholar Roger Fisher
described this relationship by stating that "[1] aw may not restrain govern250
ments from doingwhat they want but [it] can influence what they want."
A second contribution of this Article is its recognition of IL as a
process rather than a result. This viewpoint adds to existing scholarship, including Higgins' definitions of international law as a process
that necessarily involves meta-legal considerations of policy and politics
and Koh's exploration of the ways that process-whether through
participation, interaction, or norm-internalization-lead to institutional habits and patterns of compliance. 251 Raustiala addresses the
reasons states care about international agreements by suggesting that
they recognize how institutional design and process can affect outcomes. 25 2 This approach also builds upon existing scholarship such as
Slaughter's proposal that the international order needs to move toward
a model where the criteria for defining who can be a player in the
international system is not sovereignty, but who has the capacity to
participate in transgovernmental networks in order
to achieve more
25 s
effective global coordination and problem solving.

Third, considering compliance as an outcome of a process modifies
the vision of international lawmaking. Compliance has been a cornerstone of IL and of any functioning legal system because "[t]o be
authoritative, legal rules and decisions must affect the actions of those
toward whom they are directed." 254 The concern is that pervasive and
continual noncompliance with IL would undermine the institution of
IL and thus the foundation of the international order. Common

249. See generally FISHER & SHAPIRO, supra note 173 (addressing similar questions about legal

process, compliance and enforcement).
250. FISHER ET AL., supranote 63, at 245-46.

251. SeeKoh, supra note 31, at 196-97.
252. See Raustiala, supra note 79, at 436 (citing Barbara Koremenos et al., The RationalDesign
ofInternationalInstitutions,
55 INT'L ORG. 761, 762 (2001)).
253. SLAUGHTER, supranote 46, at 34-35.

254. SeeTYLER, supra note 20, at 19.
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understandings of how best to achieve state compliance with international law rely on mandatory and formal enforcement mechanisms like
sanctions, monitoring and reporting or use of force. Rules and decisions are generally created to govern human behavior.2 55 Laws are both
negative, preventing actors from doing something, and positive, requiring actors to do something. Compliance has been framed through
deterrence methods, or sticks, and incentive approaches, or carrots.
This structure has dominated compliance efforts in the IL model, a
system that lacks many of the enforcement mechanisms present in
domestic legal systems.2 56 Where enforcement mechanisms do exist
they can be both expensive and unreliable. Absent such enforcement
mechanisms, voluntary compliance becomes not only ideal but necessary. This Article presents an alternative way to think about compliance. If compliance is no longer retroactive to a rule but becomes a
part of how the rule is made, then it stands to reason that rule-making
processes can influence state behavior. Reconsidering international
lawmaking in this way addresses many of the challenges raised about
the limits of international law. IDR can inform how to revisit the
process by which international rules and agreements are formed. The
"mere existence of the rule does not in itself suffice to promote the
interests of the party wishing to rely on it."' 257 Such a transformation is

recommended if international law is going to keep up with the demands of our shifting global landscape. Much has been written about
the dimensions of this new international system, from the changes in
security law and terrorism to the rising importance of non-state actors
to the blurring line between transnationalism and internationalism.2 58
In light of these changes, views about how to achieve state compliance
must shift as well.
Fourth, this Article has demonstrated the need to consider IDR
within the larger framework of international legal studies, while also
appreciating the features that make IDR unique. Whether IDR and IL
represent two distinct disciplines or subcategories of one, it is clear that
each informs the other. The growth of IDR around the world continues
to blur the lines between legal processes and non-legal dispute resolution approaches. IDR enhances the effectiveness of international law.
Over the past decade, IDR efforts in Africa have increased knowledge

255. Id.
256. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAw, introductory note (1987) (stating

that "[t] here is no executive power to enforce the law").
257. BLUM, supra note 74, at 44.
258. See generally SLAUGHTER, supranote 46.
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of and respect for international law.259 In these ways, IDR works
concurrently with IL to build faith, trust, and credibility in an international system and in the rule of law. The challenges of integrating these
disciplines are outweighed by the need for interdisciplinary scholarship
to provide insights and solutions that no one approach could achieve
on its own. The timing for integration is ripe as international legal scholars
are currently reshaping international law's future research agenda and as
IDR scholarship is beginning to grow. As demonstrated above, IDR is a
part of the toolkit, along with international law, for dealing with international disputes and for managing international relationships.
In conclusion, international legal scholars have long been preoccupied with proving the merits of the discipline. However, if our aim is to
"critically examine how international law works, rather than to assume
its power, 260 or limits, then we must shift our scholarly focus to

improving our international legal process. North Korea's participation
in the Six-Party Talks offers a highly visible example of how process can
inform decisions and shape outcomes. In considering how to address
the complexities of achieving state compliance with international law,
leading scholars agree that voluntary compliance is the way forward.2 6 '
Attempting to enforce international law through force or coercion is
costly and ineffective in the long term. If international law's goal is to
achieve compliance, then international legal processes must be designed in ways that maximize participation, promote credibility, coordinate interests and consider emotions.
This Article has demonstrated how IDR enhances the explanatory
power of international legal process. IDR offers methods that achieve
results through collaboration not enforcement. Such increased collaboration, problem-solving and relationship-building are ever more essential as our world becomes more connected. As Roger Fisher advised
"l[t] he best way to improve a game is to play the game in ways that make
it a better game to play., 262 Perhaps, following this counsel, IDR can
serve as a catalyst for achieving such a change.

259. See Ken Menkhaus, A "Sudden Outbreak of Tranquility:"Assessing the New Peace in Africa, 28
FLETCHER F. WoRLD AmF. 73, 85-87 (2004).

260. Raustiala, supranote 79, at 443.
261. Koh, supra note 220, at 2645-56 (noting that both Franck and the Chayes' ultimately
agreed on a preference of voluntary over coerced compliance) (reprinted in FOUNDATIONS, sUpra
note 10, at 195-96).
262. FISHER, supra note 219, at 351.
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